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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

“ASK YOUR DOCTOR IF THIS PRODUCT IS RIGHT FOR YOU”:
PEREZ v. WYETH LABORATORIES, INC., DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER
ADVERTISING AND THE FUTURE OF THE LEARNED
INTERMEDIARY DOCTRINE IN THE FACE OF THE FLOOD OF
VIOXX® CLAIMS

I. INTRODUCTION
A television commercial fades into a scene depicting a woman peacefully
asleep with a warm smile on her face. The camera pulls back focusing on a
cartoon fairy flying around the room while a deep soothing voice recounts the
product’s possible risks “product may cause blood clots, heart attack, and in
the extremely rare cases, stroke. To find out if this product is right for you,
consult your doctor.” The viewer thinks, “Why can’t I sleep like that? I want
that magical pill.” However, what consumers need to understand is that there
are no magical pills. Every prescription drug is inherently coupled with risks
and dangers of which consumers need to consider before swallowing pills by
the handful.
Further problematic is the degree to which the average consumer heeds the
brief warning at the close of the commercial once they believe the advertised
product is their cure-all. Some argue that manufacturers who engage in direct
to consumer advertising, the dissemination of product information from drug
manufacturers directly to the end consumer, should face direct product liability
because of those advertising efforts. Others, however, argue the learned
intermediary doctrine, which relieves drug manufacturers of their duty to
directly warn the end consumer of product dangers by instead providing
warnings to prescribing physicians, should continue to shield manufacturers
from liability. 1
Pharmaceutical companies employing mass direct-to-consumer advertising
campaigns should remain protected by the learned intermediary doctrine as
advertising techniques have not fundamentally changed the physician’s role in
prescribing medications to warrant the doctrine’s elimination. A line must be
drawn with respect to the degree of warning provided to the American public;
manufacturers should not be required to overload consumers with product
1. See discussion infra at part III. Also, for a detailed discussion concerning the
development of the law of liability for pharmaceutical manufacturers and FDA regulation of
prescription drug approval and the learned intermediary doctrine, see Victor E. Schwartz and Phil
Goldberg, A Prescription For Drug Liability and Regulation, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 135 (2005).
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warnings in order to ensure they understand potential hazards. Undeniably,
each consumer should retain the ability to read and understand product
warnings and appreciate the potential side effects of the product, and
corporations should by no means be permitted to misrepresent, leave out, or
misconstrue their products’ dangers. One commentator noted that “No one
disputes that the ultimate user of any product has the right to be apprised of
risks associated with that use.” 2
This comment will discuss whether the learned intermediary doctrine
should continue to be applied considering the increase in direct-to-consumer
marketing. Specifically, it will address whether an exception to the learned
intermediary doctrine should be accepted for product liability claims against
pharmaceutical manufacturers for failure of the duty to warn given direct-toconsumer marketing, the court’s decision in Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories,
Inc., 3 and the learned intermediary doctrine, focusing on the influx of litigation
concerning the drug Vioxx.
This comment concludes that no exception to the doctrine should be
provided due to the increased use of ect-to-consumer advertising because
“[l]iability for inadequate warnings will almost certainly increase if courts
abandon the learned intermediary rule and require drug manufacturers to warn
consumers instead of physicians when they engage in direct to consumer
advertising.” 4
To reach this conclusion, this comment will address the current state of the
law regarding manufacturers’ duty to warn, the advent of direct-to-consumer
advertising, the scope of the learned intermediary doctrine, the doctrine’s fate
following Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., FDA regulation of
pharmaceutical advertisements, and current mass tort litigation surrounding
Vioxx.
II. CURRENT LAW REGARDING THE DUTY TO WARN
A.

General Overview of the Duty to Warn

Product manufacturers and sellers are generally under a common law duty
to provide adequate warning to consumers of possible dangers associated with
a product’s use. 5 The duty to warn extends to a product’s manufacturer, seller,
2. See discussion infra at part IV.
3. See generally Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999).
4. Richard C. Ausness, Will More Aggressive Marketing Practices Lead to Greater Tort
Liability for Prescription Drug Manufacturers?, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 97, 97 (2002).
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1961). It states
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user
or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to
the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if: (a) the seller is engaged in the
business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or
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distributor, dealer, wholesaler or supplier. 6 Thus, non-manufacturers may be
subject to liability for a product where predecessors in the distributive chain
failed to provide the consumer with an adequate warning. 7 Under the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, the duty requires manufacturers to warn of a
product’s danger if the manufacturer or supplier knows (1) the product is
dangerous, (2) that the danger is not obvious or known to or readily
discoverable by the user, and (3) not one which arises only because the product
is put to some unforeseeable or unexpected use. 8
The duty to warn serves two specific functions. First, the duty aids in
instructing consumers to proper product use in hopes of reducing injuries
resulting from misuse. Secondly, by having access to the warnings, the
consumer is able to make an informed choice whether to use the product and
be exposed to the associated risks. 9
However, a manufacturer’s failure to provide an adequate warning renders
the product unreasonably dangerous and thus subjects the manufacturer to
liability for damages under strict liability. 10 Though including an adequate

consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. (2) The rule
stated in Subsection (1) applies although: (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in
the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer has not bought the
product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
Id.
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. f (1965). It states
The rule stated in this Section applies to any person engaged in the business of selling
products for use or consumption. It therefore applies to any manufacturer of such a
product, to any wholesale or retail dealer or distributor, and to the operator of a restaurant.
It is not necessary that the seller be engaged solely in the business of selling such
products. Thus the rule applies to the owner of a motion picture theatre who sells popcorn
or ice cream, either for consumption on the premises or in packages to be taken home.
Id.
7. J. Scott Dutcher, Comment, CAUTION: This Superman Suit Will Not Enable You to
Fly—Are Consumer Product Warning Labels Out of Control?, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 633, 635 (2006).
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965). It states
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another to use is subject
to liability to those whom the supplier should expect to use the chattel with the consent of
the other or to be endangered by its probable use, for physical harm caused by the use of
the chattel in the manner for which and by a person for whose use it is supplied, if the
supplier: (a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous
for the use for which it is supplied, and (b) has no reason to believe that those for whose
use the chattel is supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and(c) fails to exercise
reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condition or of the facts which make it
likely to be dangerous.
Id.
9. JAMES A. HENDERSON & AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND PROCESS 337
(4th ed. 2000); Caroline L. Nadal, The Societal Value of Prescription Drug Advertisements in the
New Millennium: Targeted Consumers Become the Learned, 9 J.L. & POL’Y 451, 457-58 (2001).
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
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warning provides protection from strict liability, warnings will not necessarily
protect manufacturers from claims for product defects. 11 In constructing these
adequate warnings, manufacturers are not required to foresee all possible uses
or misuses of their products, but are only required to provide warnings to each
consumer according to reasonably foreseeable uses and misuses. 12
B.

Foundational Elements of a Failure to Warn Cause of Action

Plaintiffs injured from allegedly defective products may bring failure to
warn claims against the product’s manufacturer, seller or distributor. 13 To
succeed, plaintiffs must establish (1) that the manufacturer, supplier, or seller
knew or should have known of the dangers related to the product’s intended
use; (2) the product’s user was reasonably unaware of these dangers; (3) the
manufacturer, supplier or seller failed to exercise reasonable care to notify the
consumer of the product’s unsafe condition or of facts which make the product
prone to be dangerous, and (4) that the risk and degree of harm was large
enough to justify that a warning should have been provided. 14
Under the Restatement (Third) of Torts, three primary methods exist for
plaintiffs to establish that a product is defective. 15 First, a consumer can
establish a manufacturing defect in the product by proving that the product
deviates from the manufacturer’s design or performance standards of identical
units. 16 Secondly, a product may be defective by design where the injured

11. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (1998); see also
Dutcher, supra note 8, at 635.
12. Dix W. Noel, Products Defective Because of Inadequate Directions or Warnings, 23 SW.
L.J. 256, 264 (1969) (citing Glittenberg v. Doughboy Recreational Indus., 491 N.W.2d 208, 212
(Mich. 1992)).
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1961).
14. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(d) (1998).
15. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(a)-(c) (1998) It states
A product is defective when, at the time of sale or distribution, it contains a
manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is defective because of inadequate
instructions or warnings. A product: (a) contains a manufacturing defect when the product
departs from its intended design even though all possible care was exercised in the
preparation and marketing of the product; (b) is defective in design when the foreseeable
risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of
a reasonable alternative design by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the
commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the alternative design renders the
product not reasonably safe; (c) is defective because of inadequate instructions or
warnings when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been
reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the seller or
other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the
omission of the instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably safe.
Id.; see also Kenneth Ross, Legal and Practical Considerations for the Creation of Warning
Labels and Instruction Books, 379 P.L.I. LITIG. 103, 105 (1989).
16. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) (1998).
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party can establish that a design defect exposed the user to a reasonably
preventable risk. 17 Finally, the product may be deemed unreasonably
dangerous due to market defects. 18 Market defects include (1) the failure to
provide warning of the risks or hazards of using the product, (2) failure to
provide an adequate warning of those risks or hazards, 19 or (3) failure to
provide appropriate and adequate instructions and directions for safe use of the
product. 20
C. Liability and Prescription Drug Manufacturers
Restatement (Second) of Torts places pharmaceutical drugs into a category
of products designated as “unavoidably unsafe.” 21 The “unavoidably unsafe”
product category of comment k is governed by a separate standard which
stands as “an exception to the Restatement’s general rule that one who markets
goods must warn foreseeable ultimate users of dangers inherent in the
product.” 22 Distribution of unavoidably unsafe products is rationalized on the
ground that “[a]ll prescription drugs pose hazards, whether minute or great, to
consumers. However, the same drugs cure life-threatening diseases, remedy
crippling illnesses, alleviate physical aches, pains, and provide numerous other
benefits.” 23 More specifically, section 6 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts

17. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(c) (1998).
18. See id.
19. For the purposes of this note, what constitutes an inadequate warning for general
consumer goods is immaterial and will not be discussed. See infra text accompanying notes 10607 for a discussion of adequate warnings for pharmaceuticals.
20. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(c) (1998) (emphasis
added).
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A) cmt k (1965). It states
Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which, in the present state of
human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary
use. These are especially common in the field of drugs. . . . Such a product, properly
prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it
unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of many other drugs, vaccines, and the like,
many of which for this very reason cannot legally be sold except to physicians, or under
the prescription of a physician. . .The seller of such products, again with the qualification
that they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where the
situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences
attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with an
apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable
risk.
Id.
22. Woodside, III & Maggio, supra note 3, at 2; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402(A) cmt. k (1969).
23. Nadal, supra note 10, at 459.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

426

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:421

addresses product liability for prescription drug manufacturers 24 and applies
only to those products sold or distributed through a health care provider
prescription. 25
Restatement (Third) of Torts §6(d), addressing liability for defective or
inadequate warnings for pharmaceuticals, provides:
(d) A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe because of
inadequate instructions or warnings if reasonable instructions or warnings
regarding foreseeable risks of harm are not provided to:
(1) Prescribing and other health care providers who are in a position to reduce
the risks of harm in accordance with the instructions or warnings; or
(2) The patient when the manufacturer knew or had reason to know that no
health care provider would be in a position to reduce the risks of harm in
accordance with instructions or warnings. 26

An adequate warning is one that presents information about all significant
risks accompanying a product’s use and discloses “the actual likelihood and
gravity of such risks when they are known by the manufacturer.” 27 A warning
may be deemed inadequate if the print is too small, not in a prominent
position, phrased with insufficient intensity to be proportional to the danger, is
ambiguous or not easily understood, not geared toward its intended audience
(i.e. technical language to warn lay persons), or not communicated through
appropriate channel. 28
Both the Restatement (Second) of Torts and Restatement (Third) of Torts
suggest that drug manufacturers should not be held strictly liable for failure of

24. Michael J. Wagner & Laura L. Peterson, The New Restatement (Third) of Torts—Shelter
From the Product Liability Storm for Pharmaceutical Companies and Medical Device
Manufacturers, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 225, 229 (1998).
25. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(a) (1998), stating,
A manufacturer of a prescription drug or medical device who sells or otherwise distributes
a defective drug or medical device is subject to liability for harm to persons caused by the
defect. A prescription drug or medical device is one that may be legally sold or otherwise
distributed only pursuant to a health-care provider’s prescription.
Id.
26. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(d) (1998).
27. Ausness, supra note 5, at 104-05 (citing Martinkovic v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 669 F. Supp.
212, 216 (N.D. Ill. 1987)).
28. See id. at 105-06 (citing Gardner v. Q.H.S., Inc., 448 F.2d 238, 243 (4th Cir. 1971);
D’Arienzo v. Clairol, Inc., 310 A.2d 106, 111 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1973); Salmon v. Parke,
Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 1359, 1363 (4th Cir. 1975); Mahr v. G.D. Searle & Co., 390 N.E.2d 1214,
1230 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Bryant v. Technical Research Co., 654 F.2d 1337, 1345-46 (9th Cir.
1981); MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E. 2d 65, 71-72 (Mass. 1985); Sterling Drug,
Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978, 991-92 (4th Cir. 1975)).
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the duty to warn of unknown potential dangers. 29 Recognizing the potential
negative impacts product liability could have on a manufacturer’s future
research and development, courts adopted a negligence standard for imposing
liability on drug manufacturers when they act unreasonably by failing to warn
of dangers of which they knew or should have known. 30 “The test turns on
whether the defendant acted as a reasonably prudent manufacturer would have
acted in similar circumstances. . . .the test plainly provides that no liability
results for unknown and unknowable risks.” 31
The Restatement (Third) of Torts, therefore, has adopted what is known as
the learned intermediary doctrine, which relieves drug manufacturers of their
duty to warn end consumers when adequate warnings were instead provided to
prescribing physicians. 32 The physicians then have the duty to warn individual
patients of the drug’ dangers before issuing a prescription. 33
III. DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER ADVERTISING
In 2003 alone, American pharmaceutical companies spent $3.2 billion
marketing prescription drugs directly to consumers. 34 Direct-to-Consumer
(DTC) advertising is the dissemination of product information by
pharmaceutical manufacturers directly to end consumers, subject to the control
of the Food & Drug Administration (FDA). 35 DTC advertising employs an
array of mediums, including magazines, newspapers, television, radio, and
other outdoor advertising. 36 Marjorie Powell, General Counsel for the
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, stated that “DTC
29. See Nadal, supra note 10, at 459; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A)
cmt. k (1965); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. m (1998).
30. See Nadal, supra note 10, at 451.
31. Wagner & Peterson, supra note 25, at 234-235.
32. The learned intermediary doctrine (LID), the focus of this note, is the subject of greater
discussion starting in Part IV. Also adopted by the Restatement (Third) of Torts, however, are
several generally accepted exceptions to the LID, and one hotly contested proposed exception.
The debated exception, holding manufacturers liable for failure of their duty to warn when
engaging in Direct-to-Consumer (DTC) advertising, is also the subject of discussion beginning in
Part IV.C.
33. See infra Part IV: The Learned Intermediary Doctrine.
34. See KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, Prescription Drug Trends, Oct. 2004, available at
http://www.kff.org/rxdrugs/upload/Prescription-Drug-Trends-October-2004-UPDATE.pdf (last
visited May 16, 2007).
35. See Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs: What are the
Consequences?: Hearing Before the Special Comm. on Aging, 108th Cong. 61 (2003) (statement
of Marjorie E. Powell, Senior Assistant General Counsel, Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America) [hereinafter Powell].
36. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, Impact of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising on
Prescription Drug Spending, Jun. 2003, at 4, available at http://www.kff.org/rxdrugs/
loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=14378 (last visited May 16, 2007)
[hereinafter Impact].
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advertising’s purpose is to inform and educate consumers about treatable
conditions, the symptoms that may help them identify the diseases, and
available therapies.” 37
Though hard to imagine, pharmaceuticals, unlike most products, were not
always advertised directly to potential consumers. 38 Instead, drugs were only
marketed directly to physicians who would then choose which drugs they
would prescribe. 39 Undoubtedly, pharmaceutical advertising changed
drastically with the advent of DTC advertising. “The modern era of DTC
advertising really began in 1985 when [the] FDA announced that the
regulations for overseeing promotion to doctors provided sufficient safeguards
to protect consumers, as well. After this, increasing numbers of DTC print
advertisements appeared.” 40
DTC advertising further evolved in the 1980s with the infamous product
Rogaine®, manufactured by the Upjohn Company, the first prescription drug
to be advertised on television. 41 Following Upjohn’s marketing breakthrough,
“almost all pharmaceutical companies have engaged in this direct marketing
practice.” 42 In 1997, further changes in FDA regulations, which removed the
requirement that broadcast advertisements must state all product information,
also had a significant impact on the use of DTC advertising. 43 The new
regulations regarding broadcast advertisements provided manufacturers the
ability to promote specific products on television and radio with less
information regarding side effects than what was required of print ads. 44 By
eliminating the full disclosure requirement, the FDA provided the industry

37. Powell, supra note 36, at 61.
38. See Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1246-47 (N.J. 1999) (“Our medical-legal
jurisprudence is based on images of health care that no longer exist. At an earlier time, medical
advice was received in the doctor’s office from a physician who most likely made house calls if
needed. The patient usually paid a small sum of money to the doctor. Neighborhood pharmacists
compounded prescribed medicines. Without being pejorative, it is safe to say that the prevailing
attitude of law and medicine was that the ‘doctor knows best.’” (citing Logan v. Greenwich Hosp.
Ass’n 465 A.2d 294, 299 (Conn. 1983))).
39. See Ausness, supra note 5, at 98 (“At one time, prescription drug manufacturers directed
their promotional efforts solely at physicians and other health care providers. They provided
information about their products in the Physician’s Desk Reference and sometimes placed
discreet advertisements in medical journals and other professional publications.”).
40. See Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs: What are the
Consequences?: Hearing Before the Special Comm. on Aging, 108th Cong. 29 (2003) (statement
of Janet Woodcock, M.D., Director, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, U.S. Food and
Drug Administration) [hereinafter Woodcock].
41. See Perez, 734 A.2d at 1251.
42. Id. The court also stated “These campaigns ‘bring to bear all the slick pressure of which
Madison Avenue is capable.’” Id. (citation omitted).
43. See infra Part VI.A-B.
44. See Impact, supra note 37, at 1.
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with a more cost-effective method of advertising warning compliance. 45 After
the 1997 changes, “the FDA provided the impetus for drug manufacturers to
launch full-scale advertising programs (in broadcast media) directed at
consumers,” and manufacturers dramatically increased the use of television ads
to tout their latest products. 46 The number of DTC broadcast advertisements
submitted to the FDA following the changes has been 293 in 1999, 443 in
2000, 376 in 2001, 486 in 2002, 474 in 2003, and 586 in 2004. 47
Although pharmaceutical promotion spending has increased, doubling
from $9.2 billion in 1996 to $19.1 billion in 2000, most promotional spending
(approximately 86%) remains directed towards physicians. 48 Thus, only 14%
of pharmaceutical advertising dollars are spent on DTC advertisements.
Though only a small portion is spent on DTC advertising, it “seems to be the
fastest growing part of the marketing budget.” 49 Expenditures on DTC
advertising rose from $800 million in 1996 to $2.7 billion in 2001, and reached
$3.2 billion in 2003. 50 Further, 84% of those surveyed in a 2002 Kaiser
Family Foundation study reported they had seen or heard an ad for prescription
medication. 51
To pharmaceutical companies, these advertising campaigns serve a vital
function. DTC advertising focuses the consumer’s attention on the product
and encourages those patients to consult their physicians regarding the

45. Jaclyn Carole Hill, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine and Beyond: Exploring Directto-Consumer Drug Advertising Liability In the New Millennium, 72 DEF. COUNS. J. 362, 362
(2005).
46. Id. at 364-65 (parentheses added); Christopher Q. Pham, The Learned Intermediary
Doctrine and DTC Advertising, L.A. LAW. Feb. 26, 2004, at 16; see also MARCIA ANGELL, THE
TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES: HOW THEY DECEIVE US AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT
123-24 (2004); see also Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1251 (N.J. 1999) (“Pressure
on consumers is an integral part of drug manufacturer’s marketing strategy. From 1995 to 1996,
drug companies increased advertising directed to consumers by ninety percent.”).
47. The Impact of Direct-to-Consumer Drug Advertising on Seniors’ Health and Health
Care Costs: Hearing Before the Special Comm. on Aging, 109th Cong. 20 (2005) (statement of
Rachel E. Behrman, M.D., M.P.H., Deputy Director, Office of Medical Policy Center for Drug
Evaluation and Research, U.S. Food and Drug Administration) [hereinafter Behrman].
48. See Impact, supra note 37, at 3 (further breaks down the spending and shows 29% of the
spending is through sales representative directed at physicians and hospitals, 55% of the spending
is accounted for by free drug samples that pharmaceutical representatives provide to physicians,
14% on DTC advertising, and 2% on advertising in medical journals).
49. ANGELL, supra note 47, at 123.
50. Press Release, Kaiser Family Foundation, Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug
Advertising Adds Significantly to Prescription Drug Spending Growth, New Study Finds (Jun. 11,
2003), available at http://www.kff.org/rxdrugs/ upload/impact-of-driect-to-consumer-advertisingon-prescription-drug-spending-new-release.pdf); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO
CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTORS 03-177, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: FDA OVERSIGHT OF DIRECT-TOCONSUMER-ADVERTISING HAS LIMITATIONS 3 (2002).
51. See Impact, supra note 37, at 4.
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advertised drug. 52 “For consumers/patients, such marketing suggests a
movement in an evolving health care system where patients are making
decisions that doctors used to make for them.” 53 In 2001, AstraZeneca spent
$500 million persuading consumers to switch from Prilosec to Nexium. 54 Of
specific importance to this comment, as will later be discussed, Merck & Co.,
Inc. spent $160 million in 2000 advertising its osteoarthritis drug Vioxx. 55
Overwhelming evidence establishes the effectiveness of such campaigns as
“[t]hese efforts are not just an essential part of manufacturer’s marketing plans;
they are an extremely successful one.” 56 Prior to 1980, drug sales remained
relatively level. 57 However, from 1980 to 2002 drug sales in the United States
tripled, reaching more than $200 billion a year. 58 Further, a 2001 Kaiser
Family Foundation study showed 30% of consumers discussed a drug they had
seen advertised with their physician, 59 half of which received prescriptions. 60
Further, a result of male celebrity testimonials in print and broadcast, sales of
male impotency products increased to $788 million in 1998, with
approximately 7.5 million prescriptions being written. 61 A National Institute
for Health Care Management (NIHCM) study also showed that between 1999
and 2000, prescriptions for the fifty most heavily advertised drugs rose six
times greater than all other drugs. 62 Specifically, Merck’s $160 million
advertising investment in 2000 netted the company a 360% increase in sales of

52. See Tamar V. Terzian, Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug Advertising, 25 AM. J.L.
& MED. 149, 157 (1999) (noting physicians feel more pressure from patients to prescribe drugs
patients have seen advertised); see also ANGELL, supra note 47, at 116 (“You also pay for a
nearly infinite variety of promotions directed at you. Here the expectation is that you will ask
your doctor to prescribe the drugs for you.”).
53. Nadal, supra note 10, at 453.
54. ANGELL, supra note 47, at 118.
55. KATHARINE GREIDER, THE BIG FIX: HOW THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY RIPS OFF
AMERICAN CONSUMERS 89 (Public Affairs 2003) (stating that Merck spent more advertising
Vioxx than did Pepsi Cola, Budweiser, Nike, or Campbell’s soups).
56. Perez v. Wyeth Labs. Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1252 (N.J. 1999).
57. See ANGELL, supra note 47, at 3; see also Powell, supra note 36, at 62 (Attributing the
rise in pharmaceutical spending instead to “changing standards of medical care that emphasize
greater use of medicines, and treatment of previously untreated or undertreated patients”).
58. See ANGELL supra note 47, at 3.
59. See Impact, supra note 37, pg 5.
60. See GREIDER, supra note 56, at 89; see also Powell, supra note 36, at 62 (“Despite
claims by some critics, there is no evidence that DTC advertising encourages inappropriate
prescribing of prescription medicines.”).
61. See Perez, 734 A.2d at 1252.
62. See GREIDER, supra note 56, at 89.
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Vioxx. 63 Thus, “the return generated by increasing spending on DTC
advertising appears to be significant.” 64
Manufacturers argue DTC ads are beneficial because they serve an
educational function of raising viewers’ awareness of personal health. 65 DTC
proponents suggest a variety of benefits flowing from DTC advertising,
including the fact that the advertising informs consumers of an existing
treatment for a certain condition, may cause the consumer to realize he suffers
from a certain condition by identifying like symptoms, alerts those with
ailments that a treatment has become available where one previously did not
exist, and alerts those under treatment that a new more convenient remedy with
reduced side effects is available. 66 Janet Woodcock, Director of the FDA’s
Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, reported in 2003 that “[r]esearch by
FDA and other entities has documented that accurate [DTC] prescription drug
promotion can lead to significant increases in the detection of under-treated
conditions like high blood pressure, diabetes, and depression with consequent
health benefits for Americans.” 67
Opponents of DTC advertising, however, respond “that the advertisements
undermine ‘the protection that is a result of requiring a physician to certify a
patient’s need for a prescription drug.’” 68 Further, there is the danger that
information supplied by manufacturers to consumers is self-interested and
biased. 69 Others believe DTC marketing manipulates consumers because
“[e]verything is being presented as a wonderdrug.” 70 Another opposing
argument is that DTC ads are contributing to the drastic increases in health
care costs and spending 71 because “[d]octors don’t want to alienate their
63. See id.; see also Rosenthal et al., Demand Effects of Recent Changes in Prescription
Drug Promotion, May 29, 2003, available at http://www.kff.org (“every additional $1 the
industry spent on DTC advertising yielded an additional $4.20 in sales”).
64. See Impact, supra note 37, at 8.
65. See Alan V. Holmer, Direct-to-Consumer Advertising—Strengthening Our Health Care
System, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 526, 526-27 (2002).
66. See Paul H. Rubin, Ignorance is Death: The FDA’s Advertising Restrictions, in
AMERICAN HEALTH CARE: GOVERNMENT, MARKET PROCESS, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 285,
285-311, 304-05 (Roger D. Feldman ed., 2000).
67. Woodcock, supra note 41, at 32.
68. Mitchell S. Berger, A Tale of Six Implants: The Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories Norplant
Case and the Applicability of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine to Direct to Consumer
Promotion, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 525, 566 (2000) (citing Matthew F. Hollon, Direct-toConsumer Marketing of Prescription Drugs, 281 JAMA 382, 383-84 (Jan. 27, 1999)).
69. See id.
70. Id. (citation omitted).
71. See The Impact of Direct-to-Consumer Drug Advertising on Seniors’ Health and Health
Care Costs, 109th Cong. 92 (2005) (statement of Peter Lurie, M.D., M.P.H., Deputy Director,
Public Citizen’s Health Research Group) (“Predictably, the cost of health care is being driven up,
as patients are induced to request newer, more expensive medications instead of equally effective,
older, generic alternatives.”).
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patients, and too many of them find it faster and easier to write a prescription
than to explain why it isn’t necessary.” 72
Consequently, DTC advertising “has generated a direct tort action assault
on pharmaceutical companies.” 73 Litigation centers on the warnings included
in DTC advertisements and packaging inserts accompanying prescribed
drugs. 74 The issue of manufacturer liability for the failure of the duty to warn
has specifically focused on the learned intermediary doctrine.
IV. THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY DOCTRINE
A.

Introduction to the Learned Intermediary Doctrine

Generally, the learned intermediary doctrine (LID) establishes that
manufacturers fulfill their duty to warn consumers of product hazards by
providing accurate warning information to the prescribing physician. 75 The
physician is then charged with providing those warnings to individual
patients. 76 Simply stated, the manufacturer is excused from its duty to warn
each patient receiving the product when adequate warnings are provided to
prescribing physicians. 77
Prescribing physicians, therefore, act as “learned intermediaries” 78
between the manufacturer and consumer in relieving the manufacturer of its
duty to purvey product warnings to the ultimate consumer. 79 Such practice
seems paradoxical to the duty to warn discussed at the start of this comment.
Instead, the LID is a deviation from the general rule that manufacturers owe a

72. ANGELL, supra note 47, at 125.
73. Jack E. Karns, Direct Advertising of Prescription Drugs: The Duty to Warn and the
Learned Intermediary Rule, 3 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 273, 274 (2000) (citing In re Norplant
Contraceptive Prod. Liab. Lit., 165 F.3d 374, 377, 379 (5th Cir. 1999)).
74. See id. at 274 (citing In re Norplant, 165 F.3d at 377, 379).
75. See In re Norplant, 165 F.3d 364; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 898 (7th ed.
1999) (“[A] prescription drug manufacturer fulfills its duty to warn of a drug’s potentially
harmful effects by informing a prescribing physician, rather than the end user, of those effects.”).
76. See In re Norplant, 165 F.3d 364.
77. See Mark P. Robinson, Jr. & Kevin F. Calcagnie, Vioxx and the Learned Intermediary
Doctrine, 8 ANDREWS DRUG RECALL LITIG. REP. 7, 1 (2005).
78. See id. at 1 (“The term ‘learned intermediary’ is said to have been first articulated in
Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966). [I]n this case we are dealing with
a prescription drug rather than a normal consumer item. In such a case the purchaser’s doctor is a
learned intermediary between the purchaser and the manufacturer. If the doctor is properly
warned of the possibility of a side effect in some patients, and is advised of the symptoms
normally accompanying the side effect, there is an excellent chance that injury to the patient can
be avoided.”).
79. See Jeffrey E. Grell, Restatement (Third) of Torts, Section 8(D): Back to the Future of
the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, 19 HAMLINE L. REV. 349, 349 (1996).
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duty to reasonably warn consumers of a product’s dangers. 80 Though a
manufacturer is relieved of its duty to directly warn consumers, it may be held
liable for failure to provide adequate warnings to prescribing physicians. 81 If
the manufacturer fails to provide an ‘adequate’ 82 warning to the learned
intermediary, it then faces liability directly to the injured patient. 83
These learned intermediary physicians provide information compiled by
the manufacturer to the patient regarding side effects and other information
discovered through product research. 84 Manufacturers provide product
information to physicians in two primary methods, through the Physician’s
Desk Reference or via packaging inserts accompanying the drug, or both. 85
According to Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., the underlying theory
behind the LID is that:
Prescription drugs are likely to be complex medicines, esoteric in formula and
varied in effect. As a medical expert, the prescribing physician can take into
account the propensities of the drug, as well as the susceptibilities of his
patient. His is a task of weighing the benefits of any medication against its
potential danger. The choice he makes is an informed one, an individualized
medical judgment on knowledge of both patient and palliative. 86

The physician plays such an integral role in a patient’s health care and has a
relationship with the patient placing him in the best position to warn individual
patients of potential adverse effects. 87 Thus, the LID ensures patients receive
an independent party’s opinion in determining whether the product’s dangers
outweigh its benefits 88 as “[t]he physician’s role is intended to provoke a
meaningful discussion between patient and physician prior to making any
decision to prescribe the drug.” 89

80. See Nadal, supra note 10, at 456-57.
81. See Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc, 734 A.2d 1245, 1255 (N.J. 1999); Larkin v. Pfizer, Inc.,
153 S.W.3d 758, 764 (Ky. 2004).
82. For a discussion on when warnings are deemed adequate, see infra text accompanying
notes 106-07.
83. See Robinson, Jr. & Calcagnie, supra note 78, at 5 (citing McEwen v. Ortho Pharm.
Corp., 528 P.2d 522, 529 (Or. 1974)) (“Although the duty of the ethical drug manufacturer is to
warn the doctor, rather than the patient, the manufacturer is directly liable to the patient for a
breach of such duty.”).
84. See Karns, supra note 74, at 276.
85. Wolfgruber v. Upjohn Co., 423 N.Y.S.2d 95, 97 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) ( “[W]here the
warning given to the prescribing physician by the manufacturer through the Physician’s Desk
Reference (PDR), packaging inserts and other literature gives specific detailed information on the
risks of the drug, the manufacturer has been absolved from liability as a matter of law.”).
86. Perez, 734 A.2d at 1255.
87. See Nadal, supra note 10, at 562 n.56.
88. See Martin v. Hacker, 628 N.E.2d 1308, 1311 (N.Y. 1933).
89. See Karns, supra note 74, at 277.
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Courts have adopted the LID for four distinct reasons. First, the
complexities of medication, the ailments medications treat, and the intricacy of
the human body preclude average consumers from understanding
manufacturers’ warnings. 90 Second, physicians have specialized training to
understand the warnings and caution patients accordingly. 91 Therefore,
“information about prescription drugs can best be utilized more effectively by
physicians than by patients.” 92 Third, the LID aids to preserve the traditional
physician-patient relationship where patients give greater deference to their
physicians. 93 The physician is largely responsible for deciding which drugs to
prescribe, and the patient must rely on the physician’s choice of medication. 94
As such, “warnings are best directed at the physician rather than at the
patient.” 95 Finally, manufacturers cannot reach all potential consumers and
therefore cannot effectively convey the necessary warnings while physicians
have the requisite individualized contact with patients to adequately convey
product hazards. 96 Thus, “[t]his special standard for prescription drugs is an
understandable exception to the Restatement’s general rule that one who
markets goods must warn foreseeable ultimate users of dangers inherent in
[the] products.” 97 Guided by these principles, forty-eight states, the District of
Columbia and Puerto Rico have recognized the LID as an exception to the
manufacturer’s general duty to warn 98 Consequently, product liability actions
in these jurisdictions will often be confronted with the manufacturer’s LID
defense.

90. See Nadal, supra note 10, at 461-62 (citing Hill v. Searle Labs, 884 F.2d 1064, 1070 (8th
Cir. 1989)).
91. See id.
92. Ausness, supra note 5, at 109.
93. Nadal, supra note 10, at 461-62.
94. Ausness, supra note 5, at 108 (citing West v. Searle & Co., 806 S.W.2d 608, 613 (Ark.
1991) (stating that “the patient relies upon the physician’s judgment in selecting the drug, and the
patient relies upon the physician’s advice in using the drug.”)).
95. Id. at 108-09.
96. See Nadal, supra note 10, at 461-62 (citing Hill v. Searle Labs., 884 F.2d 1064, 1070
(8th Cir. 1989); Martin v. Ortho Pharm Corp., 661 N.E.2d 352, 357 (Ill. 1996); Brooks v.
Medtronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 1227, 1232 (4th Cir. 1984); Terhune v. A.H. Robins Co., 577 P.2d 975,
978 (Wash. 1978); Lars Noah, Advertising Prescription Drugs to Consumers: Assessing the
Regulatory and Liability Issues, 32 GA. L. REV. 141, 156-59 (1997); Swayze v. McNeil Labs, 807
F.2d 464, 471 (9th Cir. 1988); Dunkin v. Syntax Labs., 443 F. Supp. 121, 123 (W.D. Tenn.
1977); Davis v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 130 (9th Cir. 1968)).
97. Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1254 (N.J. 1999) (quoting Reyes v. Wyeth
Labs., Inc., 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir. 1974)).
98. See Robinson, Jr. & Calcagnie, supra note 78, at 3 (citing In re Norplant Contraceptive
Prods. Liab. Litig., 215 F. Supp. 2d 795, 806 (E.D. Tex. 2002)).
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The Learned Intermediary Doctrine and Consumer Claims Against
Manufacturers

“[I]f a prescription drug or medical device causes personal injury, plaintiffs
typically seek a deep pocket and sue the manufacturer, employing a variety of
legal theories and claims.” 99 In prescription drug actions, the LID
can have a significant impact upon the ultimate resolution of key issues raised
in a failure-to-warn claim, including the adequacy of warnings and causation.
Unlike in most products liability actions, the adequacy of the warning. . . .is
judged according to its adequacy for the physician, and not the user of the
product. 100

Most litigation concerning pharmaceuticals does not center around whether
any warning was provided at all, but rather on the adequacy of that
manufacturer’s provided warning. 101 Thus, considering the LID, a plaintiff
bringing a product liability claim against a drug manufacturer must first show
the manufacturer failed to adequately warn the physician of a product risk of
which the physician was otherwise unaware. 102 A plaintiff must also show a
manufacturer’s failure to warn was both the cause in fact and proximate cause
of the resulting injuries. 103 However, manufacturers typically raise the LID
defense in a motion for summary judgment, “essentially concluding that: [t]he
warnings provided were adequate for the physician; and [e]ven if a different or
better warning had contained the information allegedly absent from the
warnings already with the product, it would not have altered the physician’s
decision to prescribe it.” 104
An adequate warning to physicians, and likely to be argued by
manufacturers, is defined as one “sufficient to apprise the general practitioner
as well as the ‘unusually sophisticated medical man’ of the dangerous
propensities of the drug.” 105 However, plaintiffs are likely to argue that a
99. Pham, supra note 47, at 16.
100. Robinson, Jr. & Calcagnie, supra note 78, at 1-2.
101. Woodside, III & Maggio, supra note 3, at 1 (“Unlike other areas of products liability
where a case may be based upon a product that was improperly manufactured and does not meet
specifications, a drug that is subject to litigation is generally properly made in accordance with
manufacturing standards.”).
102. See Guidry v. Aventis Pharm., Inc., 418 F. Supp. 2d 835, 840-41 (M.D. La. 2006).
103. Woodside, III & Maggio, supra note 3, at 1.
104. Robinson, Jr. & Calcagnie, supra note 78, at 5.
105. Id. (citing Parke-Davis & Co. v. Stromsodt, 411 F.2d 1390, 1400 (8th Cir. 1969)); Jury
Instructions, Cona v. Merck & Co., 2005 WL 3965213, at *5, *9 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2005)
(“To be adequate, the warning or instruction must be the kind of warning or instruction which a
reasonable prudent manufacturer in the same or similar circumstances would have provided to the
prescribing physician. . . .When deciding if an adequate warning was given by the defendant you
should look at the totality of the information given to the physicians about the drug and its risks,
including information given in the package insert, in the published articles, in the promotional
materials and the information provided by Merck’s sales representatives.”).
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manufacturer has a duty to warn of all potential product dangers it knows or
should know exist, and “that a warning must be correct, complete and fully
descriptive, and it must convey updated information as to all of the drug’s
known side effects.” 106 Further, the mere mentioning of a side effect will not
relieve the defendant from liability if the degree of the associated risk is
inadequately conveyed. 107
A plaintiff must also establish the element of causation, “that an adequate
warning would have persuaded the physician not to prescribe the drug.” 108
Naturally, manufacturers will argue the warning was not the proximate cause
of the claimant’s injuries and that a varied warning would not have dissuaded
the physician from prescribing the drug. 109 If a manufacturer meets its burden
of proof regarding a warning’s adequacy, without some evidence to the
contrary, “courts are not reluctant to grant summary judgment.” 110
Therefore, the LID only provides an affirmative defense to manufacturers
if adequate warnings have been provided to prescribing physicians. However,
various circumstances demand exceptions to the LID be created where
manufacturers cannot be absolved from liability.
C. Exceptions to the Learned Intermediary Doctrine
Various exceptions to the LID have been written into the Restatement
(Third) and adopted by courts. 111 With each exception to the doctrine, the
manufacturer is required to warn consumers directly. 112 First, warnings must
be provided directly to consumers when “the manufacturer knows or has
reason to know that health care providers will not be in a position to reduce the
risks of harm in accordance with the instructions or warnings.” 113 Courts and
the Restatement specifically recognize this exception in the circumstance of a
mass immunization. 114 Courts recognize the provider is not acting “in the
same learned intermediary role” as when prescribing drugs to an individual

106. Robinson, Jr. & Calcagnie, supra note 78, at 5 (citing Martin v. Hacker, 628 N.E.2d
1308 (N.Y. 1993); Krasnopolskyv. Warner-Lambert Co., 799 F. Supp. 1342, 1345-46 (E.D.N.Y.
1992) (stating the manufacturer’s duty to warn continues even after the product has reached the
market, i.e. there is a duty to warn of risks discovered after market release)).
107. See id. (citing Stahl v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 283 F.3d 254, 267 (5th Cir. 2002);
McDonnell v. Chelsea Mfrs. Inc., 687 N.Y.S.2d 172, 174 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)).
108. Id. at 6; see also West v. Searle & Co., 806 S.W.2d 608, 613 (Ark. 1991) (stating
patients rely on physicians’ judgment in selecting and using drugs).
109. Robinson, Jr. & Calcagnie, supra note 78, at 6.
110. Id. (citing Carter v. TAP Pharms. Inc., 2004 WL 2550593 (W.D. Tex. 2004)).
111. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6 cmt. e
(1998).
112. See Nadal, supra note 10, at 463.
113. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(d)(2) (1998).
114. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(d)(2) cmt. e (1998).
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patient 115 and that “no physician-patient relationship is created and ‘the drug is
not administered as a prescription drug.’” 116 Thus, the physician is not acting
as a learned intermediary in instances of mass immunization and the LID will
not protect manufacturers against claims for product liability.
The Restatement (Third) suggests two other exceptions to the LID, 117
though qualifying that “[t]he Institute leaves to developing case law whether
exceptions to the learned intermediary rule, in these or other situations, should
be recognized.” 118 The first of the Restatement’s proposed exceptions to the
LID would apply where FDA regulations require direct warnings be given to
consumers. 119 As an example, comment e notes that birth control pills are
required to be sold with a “patient package insert” listing product warnings,
and therefore the LID would not apply to these products. 120 The proposed
FDA mandate exception has been recognized by a handful of courts who
determined oral contraceptives differ from ordinary prescriptions because the
patient herself chooses which contraceptive to take, and she does not largely
depend on the prescribing physician. 121

115. Karns, supra note 74, at 278 (citing Allison v. Merck & Co., Inc., 878 P.2d 948, 959
(Nev. 1994); Cunningham v. Pfizer & Co., Inc., 532 P.2d 1377, 1381 (Okla. 1975); Brazzell v.
United States, 788 F.2d 1352, 1358 (8th Cir. 1986); Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 127576 (5th Cir. 1974)).
116. Karns, supra note 74, at 276.
117. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6 cmt. e (1998)
(“Although the learned intermediary rule is generally accepted and a drug manufacturer fulfills its
legal obligation to warn by providing adequate warnings to the health-care provider, arguments
have been advanced that in two other areas courts should consider imposing tort liability on drug
manufacturers that fail to provide direct warnings to consumers. In the first, governmental
regulatory agencies have mandated that patients be informed of risks attendant to the use of a
drug. A noted example is the FDA requirement that birth control pills be sold to patients
accompanied by a patient package insert. In the second, manufacturers have advertised a
prescription drug and its indicated use in the mass media. Governmental regulations require that,
when drugs are so advertised, they must be accompanied by appropriate information concerning
risk so as to provide balanced advertising.”).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.; see also Wagner & Peterson, supra note 25, at 236.
121. See Nadal, supra note 10, at 466-69 (citing In re Norplant Contraceptive Prod. Litig.,
165 F.3d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 1999); Odom v. Searle & Co., 979 F.2d 1001, 1003 (4th Cir. 1992);
Lindsay v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 637 F.2d 87, 91-92 (2d Cir. 1980); MacPherson v. Searle & Co.,
775 F. Supp. 417, 422 (D.D.C. 1991); Reaves v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 765 F. Supp. 1287, 1290
(E.D. Mich. 1991); Zanzuri v. G.D. Searle & Co., 748 F. Supp. 1511, 1514-15 (S.D. Fla. 1990);
Allen v. G.D. Searle & Co., 748 F. Supp. 1142, 1147-48 (D. Or. 1989); Spychala v. G.D. Searle
& Co., 705 F. Supp. 1024, 1031 (D.N.J. 1988); Kociemba v. Searle & Co., 680 F. Supp. 1293,
1305-06 (D. Minn. 1988); Goodson v. Searle Labs., 471 F. Supp. 546, 548-49 (D. Conn. 1978);
Chambers v. G.D. Searle & Co., 441 F. Supp. 377, 381 (D. Md. 1975); West v. Searle & Co., 806
S.W.2d 608, 614 (Ark. 1991); Lacy v. Searle & Co., 567 A.2d 398, 401 (Del. 1989); Martin v.
Ortho Pharm. Corp., 661 N.E.2d 352, 356-57 (Ill. 1996); Cobb v. Syntex Labs., 444 So. 2d 203,
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More importantly for the focus of this comment, the Restatement suggests
an argument is being made, in light of increasing DTC advertising, that the
LID should not apply when manufacturers advertise directly to the public. 122
“This exception to the [LID] mandates a change in the warning standard.
Warnings must be pitched toward the reasonably prudent patient-consumer
rather than the prescribing physician.” 123 The DTC exception was the focus of
Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 124 where the New Jersey Supreme Court
was the first to create an exception to the LID for manufacturers who engage in
DTC advertising. 125
D. Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc.
In 1999 the New Jersey Supreme Court became the first court to hold the
LID does not apply to pharmaceutical companies who engage in DTC
advertising. 126 In Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., several women who
underwent surgical insertion of Norplant, a contraceptive employing six
caplets implanted under the skin of the upper arm, brought product liability
claims against the manufacturer for failure to warn of potential side effects. 127
Wyeth began an advertising campaign in 1991 that directed the
contraceptive at women, rather than physicians, on television and in magazines
“such as Glamour, Mademoiselle, and Cosmopolitan.” 128 Many women
allegedly suffered pain and scarring due to the implants and claimed aggressive
consumer directed advertising influenced their decision to seek Norplant. 129
205 (La. Ct. App. 1983); Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co., 423 N.E.2d 831, 836-37 (Ohio 1981);
McKee v. Moore, 648 P.2d 21, 24 (Okla. 1982); Taurino v. Ellen, 579 A.2d 925, 935 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1990); Terhune v. A.H. Robins Co., 577 P.2d 975, 978-79 (Wash. 1978); In re Norplant
Contraceptive Prod. Litig., 165 F.3d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 1999); Lindsay v. Ortho Pharm. Corp.,
637 F.2d 87, 91-92 (2d Cir. 1980)).
122. See Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1251 (N.J. 1999); Wagner & Peterson,
supra note 25, at 237; Karns, supra note 74, at 285.
123. Karns, supra note 74, at 285 (citing MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65,
68 (Mass. 1985)).
124. See Perez, 734 A.2d 1245.
125. See Nadal, supra note 10, at 457.
126. See generally Perez, 734 A.2d 1245.
127. See id. at 1247. The court also stated:
Plaintiffs’ principal claim alleged that Wyeth, distributors of Norplant in the United
States, failed to warn adequately about side effects associated with the contraceptive.
Side effects complained of by plaintiffs included weight gain, headaches, dizziness,
nausea, diarrhea, acne, vomiting, fatigue, facial hair growth, numbness in the arms and
legs, irregular menstruation, hair loss, leg cramps, anxiety and nervousness, vision
problems anemia, mood swings and depression, high blood pressure, and removal
complications that resulted in scarring.
Id. at 1248.
128. Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1248 (N.J. 1999).
129. See id.
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Plaintiffs further stated that no advertisement warned of the product’s dangers
but instead claimed its simplicity and convenience. 130 Wyeth, arguing based
on the LID and the New Jersey Products Liability Act, claimed it had no duty
to warn consumers directly, but instead was only required to provide warnings
to physicians, which claimants failed to prove were inadequate. 131
Relying on the LID, the trial court held “the physician retains the duty to
weigh the benefits and risks associated with a drug before deciding whether the
drug is appropriate for the patient” and that the plaintiffs failed to show the
warnings provided to physicians were inadequate. 132 The intermediate
appellate court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on the
basis of the learned intermediary doctrine. 133
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed and held Wyeth in fact had a duty
to directly warn consumers, stating:
We believe that when mass marketing of prescription drugs seeks to influence
a patient’s choice of a drug, a pharmaceutical manufacturer that makes direct
claims to consumers for the efficacy of its product should not be unqualifiedly
relieved of a duty to provide proper warnings of the dangers or side effects of
the product. 134

Thus, drug manufacturers making product claims directly to consumers could
no longer satisfy their duty to warn by providing physicians with product
warnings. 135 The court expressed general concerns regarding the practice of
DTC advertising 136 and noted the marketing strategy was intended to pressure
consumers to ask physicians for the specific products and that the
advertisements rarely informed consumers of accompanying risks. 137
In reaching its decision, the court turned to the Restatement (Third) of
Torts which left the DTC exception to “developing case law.” 138 The court
accepted the Restatement’s invitation to create a DTC exception when
interpreting section 6(d) language “when the manufacturer knows or has
reason to know that health-care providers will not be in a position to reduce the
risks of harm in accordance with the instructions or warnings.” 139

130. Id.
131. Id. at 1249.
132. Id. at 1248.
133. Id. at 1249.
134. Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1247 (N.J. 1999).
135. Ausness, supra note 5, at 116.
136. Perez, 734 A.2d at 1251-53.
137. Id. at 1251-52.
138. Id. at 1253; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(d)
cmt. e. (1999).
139. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(d)(2) (1999).
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The court also examined the four premises underlying the LID 140 and
stated that changes in national health care, coupled with DTC advertising,
resulted in several being inapplicable. 141 Specifically, the court stated the
traditional physician-patient relationship began to dissolve with the advent of
managed care organizations (MCOs) 142 and the doctrine of informed consent
as patients and insurance companies began making more health care
decisions. 143 Managed care programs reduced the physician’s time with
patients and thus his ability to adequately inform patients of drug risks. 144
Further, given the $1.3 billion manufacturers spent on DTC ads in 1998, the
court believed “drug manufacturers can hardly be said to ‘lack effective means
to communicate directly with patients’ when their advertising campaigns can
pay off in close to billions in dividends.” 145
Thus, in concluding that the LID does not apply to manufacturers engaging
in DTC advertising, the court stated:
When all of its premises are absent, as when direct warnings to consumers are
mandatory, the [LID], “itself an exception to the manufacturer’s traditional
duty to warn consumers directly of the risk associated with any product,
simply drops out of the calculus, leaving the duty of the manufacturer to be
determined in accordance with the general principles of tort law.” 146

140. The four underlying premises for the LID, as stated in Perez are: preserving the patientphysician relationship; physicians are in a better position to provide information to patients; drug
manufacturers’ lack of effective means to communicate to consumers; and given the complexity
of risk information, manufacturers would be strained to provide adequate warnings to lay
patients. See supra text accompanying notes 85-90.
141. See Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1255 (N.J. 1999); see also id.
(“Consumer-directed advertising of pharmaceuticals thus belies each of the premises on which
the learned intermediary doctrine rests.”).
142. MCOs, or Managed Care Organizations, are corporate organizations which contract
physicians into preferred networks for their insured’s use. In exchange for proving the MCO
lower rates, physicians receive increased patient clientele. Specific types of MCOs include
Health Management Organizations (HMOs) and Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs).
143. See Perez, 734 A.2d at 1255; see also id. at 1257 (“Patient choice is an increasingly
important part of our medical-legal jurisprudence. . . .Accordingly, a patient must be informed of
material risks, which exist ‘when a reasonable patient, in what the physician knows or should
know to be the patient’s position, would be ‘likely to attach significance to the risk or cluster of
risks’ in deciding whether to forego the proposed therapy or to submit to it.’” (citation omitted)).
144. See id. at 1255; see also Bernard J. Garbutt, III and Melinda E. Hoffman, Recent
Developments in Pharmaceutical Products Liability Law: Failure to Warn, The Learned
Intermediary Defense, and Other Issues in the New Millennium, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 269, 274
(2003) (“As a result of this new system, patients have less freedom in their choice of doctors, and
doctors have monetary incentives to reduce costs of treatment and to crowd more patients into
their schedule, thereby lessening the amount of time spent with each patient.”).
145. See Perez, 734 A.2d at 1255-56 (citing Lars Noah, Advertising Prescription Drugs to
Consumers: Assessing the Regulatory and Liability Issues, 32 GA. L. REV. 141, 158 (1997)).
146. Id. at 1256 (quoting Edwards v. Basel Pharms., 116 F. 3d 1341, 343 (10th Cir. 1997)).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2007]

“ASK YOUR DOCTOR IF THIS PRODUCT IS RIGHT FOR YOU”

441

Attempting to prevent manufacturers from facing absolute liability when
engaging in DTC advertising, the Perez court adopted a rebuttable presumption
that if a manufacturer complied with FDA advertising and warning regulations,
it would not fail its duty to warn. 147 “The court thus recognized that a
pharmaceutical manufacturer’s compliance with FDA regulations, including
regulations related to DTC marketing campaigns, may shield it in a failure to
warn case.” 148
E.

Arguments in Favor a Direct-to-Consumer Exception to the LID

Critics to the LID advance several arguments against applying the doctrine
to manufacturers employing DTC. Specifically, they argue DTC advertising
has eroded the traditional patient-physician relationship because patients no
longer passively defer to their physicians regarding treatment suggestions and
orders. 149
Accordingly, the increased disjoint is attributable to DTC
advertising in that “drug companies have given consumers better access to
information about treatment options.” 150 Also contended is that the rise of the
managed care era has further deteriorated the traditional patient-physician
relationship. 151 Because MCOs bargain with drug manufacturers for lower
prices in exchange for excluding competitors’ products, MCO physicians have
less discretion in choosing which drugs to prescribe. 152 Also a perceived
product of DTC advertisements is that patients pressure MCO physicians to
prescribe specific medications on threats of seeking treatment elsewhere. 153
Proponents of the exception also argue that drug manufacturers should not
be held to a lesser duty than manufacturers of all other consumer goods. 154
They also argue that the marketing schemes employed by manufacturers
resemble those of all other consumer goods. 155 Specifically, critics purport the
marketing of lifestyle drugs “plays upon the personal insecurities and vanities
of listeners or viewers.” 156
147. Woodside, III & Maggio, supra note 3, at 12.
148. Id.
149. Ausness, supra note 5, at 120.
150. Id. (stating that drug manufacturers also provide potential customers with free videos,
brochures and information packets about products along with having websites and toll free
numbers available twenty-four hours a day).
151. Chester Chuang, Note, Is There A Doctor in the House? Using Failure-to-Warn Liability
to Enhance the Safety of Online Prescribing, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1452, 1455 (2000).
152. Charles J. Walsh et al., The Learned Intermediary Doctrine: The Correct Prescription
for Drug Labeling, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 821, 876 (1995).
153. See Yonni D. Fushman, Perez v. Wyeth, Inc.: Toward Creating a Direct-to-Consumer
Advertisement Exception to the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, 80 B.U. L. Rev. 1161, 1172
(2000).
154. Ausness, supra note 5, at 122.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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Many arguments are also advanced as to how DTC advertising furthers the
public good and how a DTC exception would create more harm than good. 157
According to a 2003 statement by the Federal Trade Commission:
[DTC advertising] can empower consumers to manage their own health care
by providing information that will help them, with the assistance of their
doctors, to make better informed decisions about their treatment
options. . . .Consumers receive these benefits from DTC advertising with little,
if any, evidence that such advertising increases prescription drug prices. 158

A 2002 survey by Prevention Magazine found 24.8 million Americans
consulted with their physician regarding medical conditions for the first time as
a result of seeing a DTC advertisement. 159 Further, a 2002 FDA survey
showed 43% of respondents sought additional information about a drug,
conditions it treats, or general health after viewing a DTC advertisement. 160
The largest source of the additional information was the patient’s physician. 161
No doubt the rise of MCOs and DTC has impacted the patient-physician
relationship and awareness of ailments and available treatments. However, to
argue changes in advertising techniques and health coverage have so
augmented the relationship as to require manufacturers to individually warn
each consumer of the list of product hazards is impracticable. Further,
research shows DTC advertising increases patient-physician contact and
questions regarding conditions and general health. Thus, DTC advertising
appears to have helped promote the public’s general health.
Although marketing schemes and insurance plans have changed, the
physician’s role as final decision-maker in writing the prescription has not and

157. See Laurie K. Marshall, Keeping the Duty to Warn Patients of the Risks and Side Effects
of Mass-Marketed Prescription Drugs Where it Belongs: With Their Physician, 26 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 95, 97 (2000).
158. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Doc. No. 2003N-0344, COMMENTS BEFORE THE
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, IN THE
MATTER OF REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON CONSUMER-DIRECTED PROMOTION 3 (2003).
159. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Doc. No. 2002N-0209, COMMENTS OF THE STAFF OF
THE BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, THE BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, AND THE OFFICE OF
POLICY PLANNING OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, IN THE MATTER OF REQUEST FOR
COMMENT ON FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUES 3 (2002) (citing Prevention, Fifth Annual Survey:
Consumer Reaction to DTC Advertising of Prescription Medicines 2001/2002 at 3 (“Consumer
surveys suggest that DTC advertising has stimulated discussions between doctors and patients,
encouraged consumers to learn more about previously undiagnosed conditions, and not prevented
doctors from recommending non-drug therapies.”)).
160. KATHRYN J. AIKIN ET AL., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: PATIENT AND PHYSICIAN ATTITUDES
AND BEHAVIORS ASSOCIATED WITH DTC PROMOTION OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS—SUMMARY OF
SURVEY RESEARCH RESULTS 3 (2004).
161. Id. Also stating that “[t]he most commonly reported sources of this additional
information were healthcare providers. Eighty-nine percent (89%) of respondents reported
obtaining information from their doctors.” Id.
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“the justifications for the doctrine are as valid today as they were when it was
created.” 162 If a DTC exception was universally adopted, and drug companies
were to warn individual consumers, the exception would first be premised on
the fact that consumers would read the warning and refrain from taking the
product if they deem it unsuitable. 163 A doubtful result.
V. POST PEREZ V. WYETH LABORATORIES, INC.
Following the Perez decision, courts in jurisdictions around the country
have been reluctant, at best, to heed the invitation of the Restatement to
delineate an exception to the LID on the basis of manufacturers engaging in
DTC advertising. The court in In re Meridia addressed the fact that few courts
have followed in New Jersey’s footsteps and stated, “[f]ive years have passed
since the New Jersey Supreme Court decided Perez. In the intervening period,
no other state has followed New Jersey’s lead. The court thus could not apply
Perez’s logic even if it desired to do so.” 164 The exception recognized in Perez
has yet to be recognized by any other court. Although the Perez decision
remains a strong plaintiff’s argument, most jurisdictions have yet to address
the applicability of the LID to manufacturers engaging in DTC advertising. 165
Facing an almost identical situation as Perez, the court in In re Norplant
Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation explicitly declined to create a DTC
exception to the LID and granted the defendant manufacturer’s motion for
summary judgment. 166 In the class action suit, the court stated, “the
overwhelming majority of jurisdictions to address the issue apply the [LID] to
define a pharmaceutical company’s duty to warn of risks associated with the
use of a prescription drug.” 167 The plaintiffs argued the LID was not
applicable to their claim because Wyeth engaged in DTC advertising. 168 The
court disagreed with the plaintiffs and stated, “This argument. . . .lacks merit in
162. Woodside, III & Maggio, supra note 3, at 13.
163. Ausness, supra note 5, at 137.
164. In re Meridia Prods. Liab. Litig., 328 F. Supp. 2d 791, 812 n.19 (N.D. Ohio 2004).
165. Pham, supra note 47, at 17; In re Norplant Prods. Liab. Litig., 215 F. Supp. 2d 795, 805
(E.D. Tex. 2002).
166. In re Norplant, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 833-34 (“Plaintiffs have failed to produce evidence
overcoming the doctrine in that they do not show that the purportedly inadequate warnings on
Norplant’s labeling were either a producing cause of and/or proximately caused Plaintiffs [sic]
subsequent injuries. Nor do they proffer evidence confirming that any of Plaintiffs’ treating
healthcare providers would not have prescribed Norplant had the labeling been different.
Defendants, however, provide the affidavit of Dr. Anita Nelson, which establishes that the
healthcare providers who prescribed Norplant were aware of the 26 ‘Adverse Reactions. . . .
[T]his motion is GRANTED as to all Plaintiffs who claim they suffer any of the 26 ‘Adverse
Reactions.’”).
167. Id. at 805 (court provides a list of states, and the controlling authority, that have adopted
the LID).
168. See id. at 827.
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all jurisdictions, except New Jersey. . . .apart from New Jersey, [DTC]
advertising does not negate the applicability of the [LID].” 169 However, ten
plaintiffs’ claims out of the 2,966 were governed by New Jersey substantive
law and were exempt from the summary judgment motion. 170 The court held
the LID did apply and focused its discussion on the fact that “[p]laintiffs did
not create a fact issue on causation because the evidence fails to show that any
of the healthcare providers cited by the Plaintiffs were unaware of the 26 side
effects.” 171 The court in an earlier 1999 Norplant opinion gave special
attention to the fact that the physician played an integral role in prescribing the
drug and educating patients about risks and benefits of using the Norplant
contraceptive. 172
Further, the court in Albertson v. Wyeth, Inc. stated, “it would be
improvident to accede to plaintiffs’ argument that a limited exception to the
learned intermediary doctrine should be created based upon direct-to-consumer
advertising.” 173 The court believed that dissemination through the media
concerning the drugs does not increase the patient’s ability to acquire the drugs
because a prescription is still required. 174 As has been seen by “developing
case law,” courts have not followed, and correctly so, the Restatement’s
suggestion that a DTC exception to the LID be created.
VI. FEDERAL REGULATIONS OF PHARMACEUTICAL ADVERTISEMENTS
A.

Current FDA Regulation of Prescription Drug Advertisements

The Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) authority to regulate the sale,
manufacture, and distribution of drugs exists under the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA). 175 Specifically, FDCA section 502(n), codified as 21
U.S.C. § 352(n), grants the FDA the authority to regulate prescription drug
advertisements. 176 Implementation of the advertisement regulation authority
169. Id.
170. Id. at 829.
171. In re Norplant Prods. Liab. Litig., 215 F. Supp. 2d 795, 826 (E.D. Tex. 2002).
172. In re Norplant Contraceptive Prod. Liab. Litig., 165 F.3d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 1999).
173. Albertson v. Wyeth, Inc., 2003 WL 21544488, at *10-11.
174. Id.
175. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (2000).
176. Woodcock, supra note 41, at 35; 28 U.S.C. § 352(n) (2000) (“In the case of any
prescription drug distributed or offered for sale in any State, unless the manufacturer, packer, or
distributor thereof includes in all advertisements and other descriptive printed matter issued or
caused to be issued by the manufacturer, packer, or distributor with respect to that drug a true
statement of (1) the established name as defined in paragraph (e) of this section, printed
prominently and in type at least half as large as that used for any trade or brand name thereof, (2)
the formula showing quantitatively each ingredient of such drug to the extent required for labels
under paragraph (e) of this section, and (3) such other information in brief summary relating to
side effects, contraindications, and effectiveness as shall be required in regulations which shall be
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rests with the Division of Drug Marketing, Advertising, and Communications
(DDMAC), within the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER). 177
The specific rules and requirements promulgated to govern drug
advertisements are contained in 21 C.F.R. § 202.1. However, “[c]onsistent
with the First Amendment, FDA may only regulate prescription advertising
that is false or misleading.” 178 Nothing in the FDCA prohibits DTC
advertising. 179
The FDA regulates advertisements and promotional materials created by
the product’s manufacturer, packer or distributor. 180 This includes materials
placed in publication by product sponsors directed to consumers, including:
“ads printed in magazines, journals and newspapers; ads broadcast over
television, radio or telephone; brochures, letters and flyers sent through the
mail; videotapes and pharmacy counter displays, billboards and patient
compliance programs.” 181
The FDA regulates those advertisements that discuss a drug’s effectiveness
and use, 182 which may include two of the three ads used by product sponsors to
communicate to consumers, “product-claim” and “reminder” ads. 183
Advertisements stating a drug’s benefits must also contain a “fair balance” of
the drug’s “risks and limitations of efficacy.” 184 Product claim ads are those
providing the product’s name and use or make a representation about the
drug. 185 Reminder ads are those disclosing the product’s name and some piece
of descriptive information, (i.e. dosage method or price information) but

issued by the Secretary in accordance with the procedure specified in section 371(e) of this title,
except that (A) in extraordinary circumstances, no regulation issued under this paragraph shall
require prior approval by the Secretary of the content of any advertisement, and (B) no
advertisement of a prescription drug, published after the effective date of regulations issued under
this paragraph applicable to advertisements of prescription drugs, shall with respect to the matters
specified in this paragraph or covered by such regulations, be subject to the provisions of sections
52 to 57 of title 15. This paragraph (n) shall not be applicable to any printed matter which the
Secretary determines to be labeling as defined in section 321(m) of this title. Nothing in the
Convention on Psychotropic Substances, signed at Vienna, Austria, on February 21, 1971, shall
be construed to prevent drug price communications to consumers.”).
177. Woodcock, supra note 41, at 33.
178. Behrman, supra note 48, at 11.
179. Woodcock, supra note 41, at 35.
180. Id. at 33.
181. Id.; 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e) (1999) (providing a general description of the various types of
regulated advertisements as well as a list of those that are exempt).
182. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(1).
183. Woodcock, supra note 41, at 34 (“The third type, ‘help-seeking’ ads, are not regulated
by FDA. Help-seeking ads are those discussing a disease or condition and advising the audience
to ask their doctor. These ads are not required to disclose any risk information because no
product was mentioned or implied.”).
184. Id.
185. Id.
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cannot also disclose the product’s use or “make any claims or representations
about the product.” 186 Thus, the FDA primarily regulates product claim ads. 187
FDA regulations under the FDCA require all prescription drug
advertisements contain “information in brief summary relating to side effects,
contraindications, and effectiveness” of the pharmaceutical. 188 To meet this
mandate, the FDCA distinguishes between print and broadcast advertisements.
Print advertisements must contain a brief summary of all risks associated with
the product. 189 Manufacturers can meet FDA’s brief summary requirement
merely by printing the packaging insert information into the advertisement’s
text. 190
Advertisements for broadcast over television, radio, or telephone, on the
other hand, must disclose the “major side effects and contraindications of the
advertised drugs in the audio or audio and visual parts of the presentation.” 191
186. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (e)(2)(i) (“Reminder advertisements., Reminder advertisements are
those which call attention to the name of the drug product but do not include indications or
dosage recommendations for use of the drug product. These reminder advertisements shall
contain only the proprietary name of the drug product, if any; the established name of the drug
product, if any; the established name of each active ingredient in the drug product; and,
optionally, information relating to quantitative ingredient statements, dosage form, quantity of
package contents, price, the name and address of the manufacturer, packer, or distributor or other
written, printed, or graphic matter containing no representation or suggestion relating to the
advertised drug product.”); see Woodcock, supra note 41, at 33.
187. Ausness, supra note 5, at 102.
188. 21 C.F.R. § 201.1(e)(4)(i)(a) (“Substance of information to be included in brief
summary., An advertisement for a prescription drug covered by a new-drug application approved
pursuant to section 505 of the act after October 10, 1962 or section 512 of the act after August 1,
1969, or any approved supplement thereto, shall not recommend or suggest any use that is not in
the labeling accepted in such approved new-drug application or supplement. The advertisement
shall present information from labeling required, approved, or permitted in a new-drug
application relating to each specific side effect and contraindication in such labeling that relates to
the uses of the advertised drug dosage form(s) or shall otherwise conform to the provisions of
paragraph (e)(3)(iii) of this section.”); see also 21 C.F.R. § 201.1(e)(3)(iii) (“The information
relating to side effects and contraindications shall disclose each specific side effect and
contraindication (which include side effects, warnings, precautions, and contraindications and
include any such information under such headings as cautions, special considerations, important
notes, etc.; see paragraph (e)(1) of this section) contained in required, approved, or permitted
labeling for the advertised drug dosage form(s). . .”); Nadal, supra note 10, at 482; see generally
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, GUIDANCE
FOR INDUSTRY: CONSUMER-DIRECTED BROADCAST ADVERTISEMENTS (1999) [hereinafter
GUIDANCE].
189. 21 C.F.R. § 201.1(e)(i); see Hill, supra note 46, at 364.
190. See Ausness, supra note 5, at 102.
191. 21 C.F.R. § 201.1(e)(i) (Advertisements broadcast through media such as radio,
television, or telephone communications systems shall include information relating to the major
side effects and contraindications of the advertised drugs in the audio or audio and visual parts of
the presentation and unless adequate provision is made for dissemination of the approved or
permitted package labeling in connection with the broadcast presentation shall contain a brief

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2007]

“ASK YOUR DOCTOR IF THIS PRODUCT IS RIGHT FOR YOU”

447

This is known as a “major statement.” Thus, the “brief summary” requires
disclosure of all information regarding all known side effects and
contraindications whereas the “major statement” merely requires a statement of
those major side effects. Although broadcast advertisements must only
provide the major statement in the ad itself, advertisers are still required to
make the brief summary or make one available. 192 The short duration of
broadcast advertisement medium, however, does not support the required
“brief summaries” in the advertisements. 193 Sponsors, therefore, “must make
an ‘adequate provision for the [sic] dissemination of the approved package
labeling in connection with the broadcast presentation.’” 194 Through the
“adequate provision” requirement 195 sponsors must provide a means by which
“most of a potentially diverse audience [would] have reasonably convenient
access to the advertised product’s approved labeling” (i.e. the brief
summary). 196 Specifically, sponsors can meet this requirement by a disclosure
in the advertisement of all of the following: a toll-free number consumers can
call and obtain labeling information, an internet web page address providing
access to the labeling, where to obtain a print advertisement containing the
brief summary, and disclosure in the advertisement that healthcare providers
can provide additional information. 197 “The regulations thus specify that the
major statement together with adequate provision for dissemination of the
product’s approved labeling can provide the information disclosure required
for broadcast advertisements.” 198
B.

Development of Regulation of DTC Advertising

With the passage of amendments to the FDCA in 1962, the FDA could
officially regulate prescription drug advertising. 199 DTC advertising was used
on a small scale prior to 1983, and was usually present via print advertisements
as a result of the medium’s ease and ability to provide a cost-effective means
of disseminating the mandated brief summary. 200 With manufacturers
preparing DTC campaigns, the FDA imposed a two year moratorium on DTC
advertising to “investigate the effects such advertising on consumers and the

summary of all necessary information related to side effects and contraindications.); see also
GUIDANCE, supra note 189.
192. GUIDANCE, supra note 189, at 1.
193. Nadal, supra note 10, at 482.
194. Id. (citing 21 C.F.R. § 201.1(e)(1)).
195. GUIDANCE, supra note 189, at 1.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 2-3.
198. Id. at 1-2.
199. Hill, supra note 46, at 363.
200. Id. at 363-64.
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efficacy of then-existing FDA regulations.” 201 In September 1985, the FDA
lifted the moratorium on DTC advertising, concluding “current regulations
governing prescription drug advertising provide sufficient safeguards to protect
consumers.” 202 Thus, manufacturers could advertise directly to consumers
under the then existing FDA regulations controlling marketing of prescription
drugs to physicians. 203
Prior to 1997, pharmaceutical manufacturers rarely employed broadcast
advertisements as the FDA required full disclosure of side effects in the ad
itself. 204
“That
made
thirty-second
spots
difficult—and
even
counterproductive.” 205 In 1997, however, FDA issued a draft guidance entitled
Guidance for Industry: Consumer-Directed Broadcast Advertisements 206
which described changes in the rules governing broadcast advertisements. 207
Subsequently, advertisers were only required to provide the major statement to
refer viewers to the four sources where consumers could obtain additional
information (web address, print ad, physician and toll-free number) and where
a full disclosure may be found. 208 Following the 1997 change, “drug
companies began to flood the airwaves with commercials about their latest
drugs. Expenditures on DTC ads nearly tripled between 1997 and 2001, and
the percentage accounted for by television increased from 25% to 64%.” 209
Through a post-marketing submission requirement, advertisers are required
by the FDCA to submit all DTC advertisements to the FDA when a new
campaign is launched. 210 Some manufacturers, on the other hand, have agreed
to submit promotions to the FDA before public release. 211 Within the FDA,
the Division of Drug Marketing, Advertising and Communications (DDMAC)
is responsible for reviewing drug promotional materials. 212 DDMAC ensures
the promotions portray a “fair balance” of risks and benefits and contain “true
statements” as required by the FDCA. 213 A fair balance exists “if the

201. Id.
202. William E. Holtz, Consumer-Directed Prescription Drug Advertising: Effects on Public
Health, 13 J.L. & HEALTH 199, 202 (1999) (citing Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of
Prescription Drugs; Withdrawal of Moratorium, 50 Fed. Reg. 36, 677 (1985)).
203. Hill, supra note 46, at 363.
204. ANGELL, supra note 47, at 123-24.
205. Id.
206. See generally GUIDANCE, supra note 189.
207. Hill, supra note 46, at 362-63.
208. GUIDANCE, supra note 189, at 1-3.
209. ANGELL, supra note 47, at 123-24.
210. Behrman, supra note 48, at 20.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 19.
213. Hill, supra note 46, at 365; 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(1) (1999) (“All advertisements for any
prescription drug . . . shall present a true statement of information in brief summary relating to
side effects, contraindications, and effectiveness.”).
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presentation of true information relating to side effects and contraindications is
comparable in depth and detail with the claims for effectiveness and safety.” 214
If an advertisement is false or misleading as to side effects or effectiveness,
does not provide the mandated “fair balance,” or fails to disclose risks of nonrecommended uses of a drug, then the advertisement will not present the
required “true statement.” 215 DDMAC’s options with regards to false or
misleading advertisements include: (1) untitled letters providing notice of
violations and a request that the violative materials be discontinued; (2)
warning letters issued for more serious violations which may pose serious
public health risks; (3) injunctions and consent decrees; (4) referrals for
criminal investigation or prosecution; and (5) seizures. 216 DDMAC received
for review roughly 31,600 promotional materials in 1999, 32,100 in 2000,
34,200 in 2001, 36,700 in 2002, 40,000 in 2003, and 52,800 in 2004. 217
Advertisements in violation of FDA regulations are subject to being
immediately stopped and can also require the sponsor to release a remedial
campaign to correct misrepresentations. 218
According to Janet Woodcock, Director of the FDA’s Center for Drug
Evaluation and Research, the purpose of FDA regulation of DTC advertising is
ensuring the ads remain positively balanced. 219
[T]here are three important things to understand about FDA’s authority in this
area. First, the statute and the regulations focus on the content, not the
existence, of prescription drug promotion. Second, the law does not make a
distinction between target audiences. The law has never prohibited advertising
prescription drugs to consumers. However, until the early 1980’s this was just
not done. Third, the act specifically forbids requiring preclearance of ads by
the FDA, except under extraordinary circumstances. 220

The FDA aims to ensure consumers are exposed to truthful, non-misleading
ads which are easily understood. 221

214. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(5)(ii).
215. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(5)(i)-(iii); Hill, supra note 46, at 365.
216. Behrman, supra note 48, at 22. Behrman also stated that since the 1997 changes, the
FDA has issued fifty-two untitled letters, six warning letters on broadcast advertisements, fifteen
untitled letters on purported reminder broadcast advertisements, and three untitled letters for
purported help seeking broadcast advertisements, and “[m]ost of the violations cited were
because the ad was misleading, e.g. the ad overstated or guaranteed the product’s efficacy,
expanded the indication or the patient population approved for treatment, or minimized the risks
of the product through either inadequate presentation or omission of information.” Id.
217. Id. at 19
218. Id.
219. Id. at 29.
220. Id.
221. See Behrman, supra note 48.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

450

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:421

VII. MERCK & CO. INC.’S VIOXX®
A.

Development and Production of Vioxx®

Approved by the FDA in May 1999, Rofecoxib, developed by Merck &
Co. Inc. and sold under the name Vioxx®, was an anti-inflammatory drug used
to treat osteoarthritis, acute pain conditions, menstrual symptoms, and
rheumatoid arthritis in adults and children. 222 Vioxx was a prescription
Cyclooxygenase-2 inhibitor, a non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drug
(NSAID). 223 NSAID pain relievers also include several over the counter
medications such as Advil (Ibuprofen) and Aleve (Naproxen Sodium). 224
Vioxx “relieved pain by blocking the enzyme cyclooxygenase (COX), which is
required for the production of prostaglandins—chemicals that mediate the pain
response.” 225
NSAIDs, besides inhibiting prostaglandins which are
responsible for the pain sensation, also reduce swelling, inflammation and
irritation which all worsen pain. 226 NSAIDs have long been used for
alleviation of “chronic or acute inflammation and pain associated with
osteoarthritis, rheumatoid arthritis, and other musculoskeletal conditions” 227
However, traditional NSAID treatments were accompanied by a significant
increased risk of gastrointestinal perforations, ulcers, and bleeding.228
Researchers later determined the COX enzyme had two forms. 229 COX-1 was
found to affect production of prostaglandins which aid in protecting the
stomach lining whereas COX-2 was found to affect production of

222. FDA.gov, COX-2 Selective and Non-Selective Non-Steroidal Anti—Inflammatory
Drugs (NSAIDs), http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/COX2/default.htm (last visited Feb. 16,
2007) [hereinafter COX-2]; see generally W. John Thomas, The Vioxx Story: Would it Have
Ended Differently in The European Union?, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 365 (2006) (providing a
thorough discussion of the rise and fall of Merck’s Vioxx and how the Vioxx issues would be
resolved in the European Union).
223. COX-2, supra note 223.
224. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 401 F. Supp. 2d 565, 570 (E.D. La. 2005).
225. Donna Scott-Tilley, Advanced Practice Nursing Extra, New Drugs: Second COX-2
Inhibitor, 99 AM. J. NURSING 24DDD, 24DDD (Oct. 1999); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 401
F. Supp. 2d at 570 (“NSAIDs work by inhibiting cyclooxygenase (COX), an enzyme that
stimulates the syntheses of prostaglandins, which are chemicals produced in the body that
promote certain effects.”).
226. Kennedy v. Merck & Co., Inc., No. 19591, 2003 WL 21658613, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App.
2003).
227. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 401 F. Supp. 2d at 571 (proving a clear background of the
creation of Vioxx and includes discussion of the development of COX-2 inhibitors); see also Paul
D. Rheingold, Merck’s Vioxx: A Lucrative Pathway to Problems, 8 No. 8 ANDREWS DRUG
RECALL LITIG. REP. 6, 1 (2005) (“The COX-2 inhibiting drugs came on the scene in the 1990s as
a type of ‘super aspirin.’”).
228. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 401 F. Supp. 2d at 571.
229. Id.
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prostaglandins which are responsible for both pain and inflammation.230
Discovering the two forms of the COX enzyme “led scientists to hypothesize
that ‘selective’ NSAIDs designed to inhibit COX-2, but not COX-1 could offer
the same pain relief as traditional NSAIDs with the reduced risk of fatal or
debilitating gastrointestinal perforations, ulcers, and bleeding.” 231
The
“selective” NSAIDs became known as “COX-2 Inhibitors,” of which Vioxx
was one. 232 At the same time Merck was developing Vioxx, Pfizer Co. was
also developing its COX-2 inhibitor Celebrex, which beat Vioxx to the market
by six months.
Vioxx was an improvement over traditional NSAIDs because it did not
carry the same risk of gastrointestinal bleeding as COX-1 inhibitors;
“[b]ecause the newest drugs block COX-2, and have minimal effects on COX1, they are considered significant pharmacologic advances.” 233 In particular,
six clinical trials showed Vioxx relieved joint pain and stiffness in patients
with osteoarthritis. 234
In order to receive FDA approval, Merck conducted the Vioxx
Gastrointestinal Outcomes Research (VIGOR) study, through which the
company intended to show that Vioxx caused fewer gastrointestinal problems
than predecessor drug Naproxen. 235 Merck submitted the VIGOR study results
to the FDA in June, 2000. However, along with a reduction in gastrointestinal
problems, the research also showed patients taking Vioxx had a rate of heart
attacks five times greater than those taking the older Naproxen. 236 Merck
justified the results by stating that Naproxen had cardioprotective effects which
aided in preventing heart attacks. Merck quickly followed the VIGOR study
with their Adenomatous Polyp Prevention on Vioxx (APPROVe) study. 237
Merck’s APPROVe study confirmed the VIGOR findings that Vioxx carried
with it an increased risk of heart attack and stroke. 238

230. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 401 F. Supp. 2d 565, 571 (E.D. La. 2005).
231. Id.
232. Id. (“In light of these scientific developments, Merck & Co., Inc. (‘Merck’) and several
other pharmaceutical companies began the development of such drugs, which became known as
‘COX-2 inhibitors’ or ‘coxibs.’ Vioxx is a COX-2 inhibitor.”).
233. Scott-Tilley, supra note 226, at 24DDD.
234. Id.
235. All About Vioxx Lawsuits, Vioxx Lawsuits—The VIGOR Study, http://www.vioxxlawyer-all-about.com/vioxx-vigor-study.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2007); see generally C.
Bombardier et al., Comparison of Upper Gastrointestinal Toxicity of Refecoxib and Naproxen in
Patients with Rheumatoid Arthritis, 343 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1520 (2000).
236. All About Vioxx Lawsuits, Vioxx Lawsuits—The VIGOR Study, http://www.vioxxlawyer-all-about.com/vioxx-vigor-study.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2007).
237. All About Vioxx Lawsuits, Vioxx Lawsuits—The APPROVe Study, http://www.vioxxlawyer-all-about.com/vioxx-approve-study.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2007).
238. Id.
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The studies showed that inhibiting COX-2 without the inhibition of COX-1
caused blood clotting, which led to the side effects creating the basis for the
Vioxx litigation. 239
What explains the clotting effect. . . .is that inhibiting COX-2 allowed a prothrombotic factor, thromboxane (a vaso constrictor which induces blood
clotting), to increase whereas allowing COX-1 to remain unrestrained stopped
the prostacyclin whose job is to inhibit platelet aggregation (blood clotting).
Thus the balance in users was switched toward clotting. 240

Clotting increases risk of heart attack and stroke because clots block arteries
and lead to ischemia (a restriction in blood supply) after the blockage. 241
Strokes result from blockages of cerebral arteries or carotid arteries feeding
blood to the brain. 242 Further troubling for Vioxx is the risk of blockage is
much higher in those with narrowed arteries, (i.e. the elderly and those with
existing heart problems), which makes it easier for clots to lodge and block
those arteries. 243
In February 2001, the FDA advisory panel recommended the FDA require
a change in Vioxx’s packaging insert to relate the results of the VIGOR study
of increased rates of heart attack and stroke. 244 However, Merck continued
aggressively marketing Vioxx to physicians and downplayed Vioxx’s role in
increasing stroke and heart attacks. In September 2001, the FDA sent Merck a
warning letter stating “You have engaged in a promotional campaign for
Vioxx that minimizes the potentially serious cardiovascular findings that were
observed in the Vioxx Gastrointestinal Outcomes Research (VIGOR)
study.” 245 In April 2002, the FDA required Merck to include the warning
regarding increased stroke and heart attack in its packaging. 246
On September 30, 2004, following publication of their APPROVe study,
Merck announced an immediate voluntarily withdrawal of Vioxx from the
market. 247 Raymond Gilmartin, president and CEO of Merck at the time of the
withdrawal, stated:

239. Rheingold, supra note 228, at 2.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Rita Rubin, How Did the Vioxx Debacle Happen?, USA TODAY, Oct. 12, 2004, at D1;
W. John Thomas, The Vioxx Story: Would it Have Ended Differently in The European Union?, 32
AM. J.L. & MED. 365, 366 (2006).
245. GREIDER, supra note 56, at 102-03.
246. Thomas, supra note 245, at 366.
247. Press Release, Merck & Co., Inc., Merck Announces Immediate Worldwide Withdrawal
of Vioxx® (Sept. 20, 2004), available at http://www.vioxx.com/rofecoxib/vioxx/consumer/
voluntary_withdrawal_statement.jsp (last visited Apr. 6, 2007).
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We are taking this action because we believe it best serves the interests of
patients. . . .Although we believe it would have been possible to continue to
market VIOXX with labeling that would incorporate these new data, given the
availability of alternative therapies, and the questions raised by the data, we
concluded that a voluntary withdrawal is the responsible course to take. 248

As previously discussed, Vioxx was the most heavily advertised drug in
2000, with Merck spending $160 million on marketing the new drug which
netted a 360% increase in sales. 249 Between May 1999 and the withdrawal of
September 2004, 105 million Vioxx prescriptions were filled in the United
States alone to an estimated 20 million patients. 250 In 2003, Vioxx worldwide
sales topped $2.5 billion. 251
B.

Current Vioxx® Litigation

Following Merck’s voluntary withdrawal of Vioxx on September 30, 2004,
thousands of individual lawsuits and roughly 160 class actions were filed in
state and federal courts alleging tort and products liability claims. 252 “The
latest mass tort, and perhaps one that will rival the fen-phen diet drug
litigation, involves Vioxx. . . Suits are being brought in many forums for heart
attacks, sudden cardiac death and strokes, as well as for a number of other side
effects.” 253 Due to the volume of suits, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation designated the Vioxx Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) and ordered it
consolidated into one court. 254 Thereafter, all Vioxx suits filed in federal
courts were transferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana, for coordination of discovery and pretrial matters. 255
Merck currently faces 27,000 individual Vioxx lawsuits nationwide. 256 As
of December 31, 2006, 4,025 Vioxx related claims had been dismissed before
being scheduled for trial, more than 1,225 of which were dismissed with
prejudice. 257 Thirty-one Vioxx suits, as of March 27, 2006, had been
scheduled for trial. 258 Fourteen of the thirty-one were either dismissed or
248. Id.
249. GREIDER, supra note 56, at 102.
250. In re Vioxx Prod. Liab. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 450, 452 ( E.D. La. 2006).
251. Id.
252. In re Vioxx Prod. Liab. Litig., 401 F. Supp. 2d 565, 571 (E.D. La. 2005); In re Vioxx
Prod. Liab. Litig., 239 F.R.D. at 452.
253. Rheingold, supra note 228, at 1.
254. See In re Vioxx Prod. Liab. Litig., 401 F. Supp. 2d 565, 571 (E.D. La. 2005).
255. In re Vioxx Prod. Liab. Litig., 239 F.R.D. at 452.
256. Adam Jadhav, Vioxx Maker Wins First Case in Madison County, But Others Await, ST.
LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Apr. 9, 2007.
257. Press Release, Merck & Co., Inc., Merck Wins Product Liability Case in Madison
County, Ill. (Mar. 27, 2007), available at http://www.merck.com/newsroom/press_releases/
corporate/2007-0327.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2007).
258. Id.
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withdrawn from the trial calendars by the plaintiffs, ten resulted in jury
verdicts in Merck’s favor, 259 five verdicts in the plaintiff’s favor and two ended
with hung juries and remain unresolved mistrials. 260
Claims against Merck allege a myriad of causes of action. Most prevalent
is the failure of the duty to warn, which is therefore accompanied with the
issues surrounding the LID and DTC advertising. 261 Claimants are attempting
to circumvent the LID by claiming that Merck failed to provide adequate
warning to their prescribing physicians. 262 Whether or not adequate warnings
were provided to physicians is a question of fact, and the plaintiffs are
therefore trying to reach the jury. 263 However, one commentator noted, “[w]e
think that the learned intermediary doctrine, the FDA approval process . . . and
the statistical realities of the Vioxx record will combine to provide Merck with
a potent defense.” 264
The combined jury instruction in Cona v. Merck & Co., Inc, and McDarby
v. Merck & Co., Inc., provided that Merck, as manufacturer of Vioxx, had a
duty to make a product that is reasonably safe, which required dissemination of
adequate warnings of the product’s risks. 265 If a manufacturer fails to provide
an adequate warning, the product is thus deemed defective under the law. 266
Therefore, Merck had a duty to provide adequate warnings about the dangers
of its product. “In the case of a prescription drug adequate warning must be
given to the doctors who will prescribe the drug. This is true because it is the
prescribing doctor who has to decide whether to prescribe a prescription drug
to a patient.” 267 The judge’s statement shows the jury was instructed to take
into consideration the LID.

259. The latest of the verdicts in favor of Merck and Co., Inc. was recently reached on March
27, 2007 in Madison County, Illinois, a jurisdiction renowned around the country for a history of
excessively high jury verdicts. Press Release, Merck & Co., Inc., Merck Wins Product Liability
Case in Madison County, Ill. (Mar. 27, 2007), available at http://www.merck.com/newsroom/
press_releases/corporate/2007-0327.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2007). The jury in Schwaller v.
Merck and Co., No. 05-L-687, found Vioxx was not the proximate cause of a 72-year-old
woman’s heart attack death, but instead that obesity and other pre-existing health conditions were
significant contributing factors in her death. Id. The jury also rejected the claim that Merck failed
to adequately warn Schwaller’s prescribing physicians of risks associated with Vioxx use. Id.
260. Id
261. Calvert D. Crary, Update: Merck’s Vioxx Litigation, LITIG. NOTES, Nov. 9, 2004,
available at http://www.litigationnotes.com/litinotes_sample3.pdf.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Jury Instructions, Cona v. Merck & Co., Inc., 2005 WL 3965213, at *5, *9 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 2005); McDarby v. Merck & Co., Inc., No. L-1296-05, 2006 WL 3965213, at *5
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2006).
266. Id.
267. Id.
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In McDarby, the plaintiff’s claim alleged that an increased risk of heart
attack was known or knowable to Merck who failed to adequately warn
physicians that patients with heart attack risk factors should not be prescribed
the drug. 268 Merck contended, however, that it provided adequate warning of
any risks that were known or knowable when the plaintiff used Vioxx. 269 “If
the defendant proves that there was no risk or the other risk was not known or
knowable during those times, then it had no duty to warn of any such risk and
cannot be held liable for failure to do so.” 270
McDarby, for which the above jury instruction was written, resulted in a
$13.5 million plaintiff’s award after the jury found that Vioxx was a substantial
contributing factor to his heart attack. 271 Plaintiff’s complaint alleged Merck
failed to disclose potential dangers associated with the Vioxx use and also
claimed misrepresentation to physicians and the public of any of the drug’s
dangers through advertisements. 272 The plaintiff, who provided records
indicating four years of Vioxx use, claimed long term use of the drug was both
the cause in fact and proximate case of his heart attack. 273 Merck, however,
contended it met all FDA regulations concerning Vioxx by providing the FDA
with all mandated information and therefore fulfilled its duty to warn. 274 The
jury disagreed with Merck and reached a unanimous verdict finding that the
manufacturer failed to adequately warn the patient of an increased risk of heart
attack associated with the drug and that their failure to warn proximately
caused his injuries. 275
Similarly, the jury in Barnett v. Merck & Co., Inc. awarded $51 million in
damages to the plaintiff, Barnett, who they found suffered a heart attack
attributed to Vioxx use. 276 Barnett began taking Vioxx in 1999 for chronic
neck pain and subsequently suffered a heart attack three years later, but
continued taking the drug until its 2004 withdrawal. 277 Barnett claimed Merck
was liable for failing to warn him of product dangers and was negligent in its
representation and production of Vioxx. 278 Merck, relying on the LID, argued
268. Id. at *6.
269. Id. at *5.
270. Id.
271. Jury Verdict, McDarby v. Merck & Co., Inc., 2006 WL 1073402, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 2006) (New Jersey Vioxx User, Wife Received $13.5 Million).
272. Jury Instruction, Cona, 2005 WL 3965213 at *9; McDarby v. Merck & Co., Inc., No. L1296-05, 2005 WL 3965213, at *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2005).
273. Jury Verdict, McDarby, 2006 WL 1073402, at *3 (New Jersey Vioxx User, Wife
Received $13.5 Million).
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Jury Verdict, Barnett v. Merck & Co., 2006 WL 2742584, at *2 (E.D. La. 2006) (Judge
Orders New Trial on Damages After Jury Awards $51 Million for Vioxx Claim).
277. Id. at *3.
278. Id.
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it discharged its duty by providing warnings to prescribing physicians and was
therefore not liable. 279 The jury found Merck did not fail to warn the plaintiff
of the danger, but was negligent for failing to warn Barnett’s prescribing
physicians of the risks associated with Vioxx. 280 Judge Fallon, presiding over
Vioxx MDL litigation, found the award was “grossly excessive” and ordered a
new trial for damages alone. 281
Ernst v. Merck and Co., Inc., provided the largest award to date for a
Vioxx claim, awarding the family of a deceased Vioxx patient $253.4 million
in damages. 282 Ernst was prescribed Vioxx in 2000 to relieve tendonitis pain
and died of a heart attack six months later. 283 Ernst’s family alleged Merck
knew of the danger and continued to market Vioxx knowing it was unsafe and
that Merck misrepresented Vioxx’s safety to the public via marketing
campaigns. 284 Merck countered by arguing Vioxx was not inherently
dangerous, that warnings provided both to patients and physicians were legal
as approved by the FDA, that it did not knowingly mislead consumers, and that
the patient’s death resulted from pre-existing medical conditions. 285 Contrary
to the manufacturer’s contentions, the jury found both marketing and design
defects to be producing causes of Ernst’s death and Merck’s negligence as the
proximate cause. 286 Although the jury awarded the plaintiffs $253 million,
Texas punitive damages caps will reduce the award to roughly $26 million.
In contrast, Dedrick v. Merck and Co., Inc. resulted in a quite different
outcome. 287 The plaintiff in Dedrick alleged he suffered a heart attack after
taking Vioxx for six months. 288 The plaintiff claimed Merck failed to
adequately warn consumers and physicians of Vioxx’s associated risks and
also breached various implied warranties by misrepresenting material facts to
his prescribing physician. 289 Specifically, the plaintiff stated, “If not for those

279. Id.
280. Id. at *4.
281. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 448 F. Supp. 2d 737, 741 (E.D. La. 2006). In explaining
his reasoning, Judge Fallon states “The Court finds that the $50 Million compensatory damages
award is excessive under any conceivable substantive standard of excessiveness. The evidence
suggests that the Plaintiff may have lost nine or ten years of life expectancy as a result of his use
of Vioxx. . . .Therefore, no reasonable jury could have found that Plaintiff’s total losses totaled
$50 Million.” Id. at 740.
282. Jury Verdict, Ernst v. Merck & Co., Inc., 2005 WL 2760303, at *2 (23d Jud. D. Tex.
2005) (Brazoria County Jury Awards Family of Deceased Vioxx User $253.4 Million).
283. Id. at *3.
284. Id.
285. Id. at *4.
286. Id.
287. Jury Verdict, Dedrick v. Merck & Co., Inc., 2006 WL 40077593, at *2 (E.D. La. 2006)
(Merck Prevails After Jury Rejects Tennessee Man’s Vioxx Claim).
288. Id.
289. Id. at *2-*3.
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negligent misrepresentations, his physicians would not have prescribed the
drug.” 290 Merck argued no evidence of increased risk of heart attack existed at
the plaintiff’s dosage level and that his pre-existing cardiovascular disease was
the actual cause his injuries. 291 In December 2006, a jury found “Merck
properly warned Dedrick’s treating physician about known risks at the time,
and that Merck’s alleged failure adequately warn his physician was not the
proximate cause of Dedrick’s injuries.” 292
The LID plays a specific roll in regards to Vioxx cases during the pre-trial
stages. Specifically, in In re Vioxx Products Liability Litigation, Merck,
arguing on the grounds of the LID, successfully defended a certification
motion for a national class of personal injury and wrongful death claims. 293 In
denying certification, the court focused on the lack of typicality among
claimants. 294 The court stated:
In this case, both the proposed class representatives and the putative
class members assert various products liability claims against Merck
under theories of negligence, strict liability, failure to warn, and
defective design. While these claims involve common issues, they also
involve individual issues such as injury, causation, the learned
intermediary doctrine and comparative fault. 295

Further, in Kennedy v. Merck & Co., Inc., an Ohio appellate court affirmed
a grant of summary judgment for Merck on the basis of the LID. 296 Kennedy,
on behalf of his deceased wife, claimed Merck failed to adequately warn her
that anaphylactoid reactions could occur by taking Vioxx. 297 Kennedy’s wife
was given free samples of Vioxx from her physician which contained a
statement on the package to see accompanying packaging insert for product
warnings. However, Kennedy’s wife was not given the packaging insert from
her physician. The court noted that Kennedy did not argue the warnings
provided to the prescribing physician were inadequate, but that the warnings
were inadequate due to the manner in which they were conveyed to his wife. 298
The trial court found Merck had no duty to ensure advertisements and printed
materials containing warnings provided directly to physicians reached the

290. Id.
291. Id. at *3
292. Id.
293. See In re Vioxx Prod. Liab. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 450, 462 (E.D. La. 2006).
294. Id. at 462-63 (“Regardless, the PSC’s reliance on mass accident class action is misplaced
in this pharmaceutical litigation. The number, uniqueness, singularity, and complexity of the
factual scenarios surrounding each case swamp any predominating issues.”).
295. Id. at 460 (emphasis added).
296. Kennedy v. Merck & Co., Inc., 2003 WL 21658613, at *6, *7 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003).
297. Id. at *2.
298. Id. at *5.
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actual patient. 299 Specifically, the appellate court, quoting the trial court,
stated “‘[c]onstruing these facts and R.C. 2307.76(c) in a light most favorable
to Mr. Kennedy, reasonable minds could only conclude that Merck discharged
its duty to warn Mrs. Kennedy of the possibility of adverse reactions to Vioxx
by warning Dr. Striebel of the risks.’” 300 The appellate court, affirming the
trial court’s grant of summary judgment, held that “Under the [LID], there
exists no requirement that Merck give any warnings for Vioxx to the consumer
if the warnings provided to the physician are adequate.” 301
Thus, litigation regarding the LID and the duty to warn centers on a factdetermination of whether Merck provided an adequate warning to prescribing
physicians. Specific attention, however, is being given to what Merck knew of
potential adverse effects and when it knew of them. If juries find an
inadequate warning was provided to physicians, the LID will be inapplicable
and Merck will be subject to products liability claims for failure of the duty to
warn.
VIII. ANALYSIS
The learned intermediary doctrine should continue to play a strong role
even in the face of increased DTC advertising. Pharmaceutical companies
should not face increased liability as a result of direct product advertising or be
held liable for failing to provide all potential adverse effects in a thirty second
television spot. The fact remains that physicians are more directly targeted by
drug manufacturer marketing than consumers 302 and are the ones ultimately
responsible for writing the prescription. 303 Thus, there should be no change in
the current allocations of the duty to warn as it should continue to fall on
physicians to ensure the drugs being prescribed are in the patient’s best interest
and that he is aware of any adverse effects accompanying treatment.
The bottom line is that pharmaceuticals themselves are not changing, and
neither are the dangers with which they are accompanied. Patients still must
have symptoms treated by the medication, and physicians still must make the
decision to prescribe. What has changed, however, is the patient’s awareness
of treatment options and his subjective opinion of his ailments. By requiring
certain drugs be available only by prescription, the FDA reflects a policy
statement that individual consumers cannot truly comprehend a drug’s effects
299.
300.
301.
302.

Id. at *5.
Id. at *4 (citation omitted).
Id. at *10.
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTORS 03-177,
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: FDA OVERSIGHT OF DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER-ADVERTISING HAS
LIMITATIONS 3 (2002) (stating that DTC advertising increased by 145% between 1997 and 2001,
and that promotion to physicians accounted for 80% of the pharmaceutical companies
promotional spending).
303. Woodside, III & Maggio, supra note 3, at 13.
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and therefore, safe usage demands professional intervention. 304 When
prescribing, the duty rests on the physician to examine the patient and
determine if a requested or needed treatment is appropriate in the
circumstance. Therefore, the duty should remain on the physician to ensure
the drugs prescribed are best suited for a patient who is fully aware of the
associated risks. If the LID is an attempt to “preserve the primacy of the
physician’s role in making treatment decisions for patients, including the
making of informed choices about prescription drugs,” 305 courts should
unequivocally continue to apply the doctrine. This holds especially true in an
age of increased DTC advertising and usurpation by patients and MCOs of the
physician’s role in treatment decisions.
Those arguing that DTC advertising has changed the role of patient and
physician are misguided. 306 The patient-physician relationship has not been
fundamentally changed by DTC advertising as critics purport. Instead,
managed care organizations and a patient per hour rate increase should be
considered when discussing physicians writing prescriptions for requested
drugs. The LID is premised on the principle that prescribing physicians are in
the best position to evaluate the patient’s needs, to understand the significance
of the risks involved and to assess the relative advantages and disadvantages of
a prescription based therapy. 307 The fact that physicians are in the best
position to evaluate the patient’s needs remains unchanged regardless of the
advertising dollars spent by drug manufacturers. For the basis of the LID, the
fundamental relationship of ill patients needing prescriptions and physicians
being required to write them, is unchanged.
With regard to impending Vioxx litigation, again, courts should not
recognize a DTC exception to the LID. The duty should remain with the
physician to warn potential patients of product hazards so long as reasonable
warnings were supplied and made available by the manufacturer. Thus, jurors
should only consider whether an adequate warning was provided to the
physician, not the end consumer, when contemplating verdicts. Specifically,
Merck complied with FDA regulations following the VIGOR study by
including packaging inserts that were received by both patients and physicians.

304. Id. at 13-14.
305. Robinson, Jr. & Calcagnie, supra note 78, at 2.
306. See generally Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999) (holding drug
manufacturers employing DTC are not protected by LID exception to the general duty to warn);
Renee Matter, Emerging DTC Advertising of Prescription Drugs and the Learned Intermediary
Doctrine: Even in the Absence of a True Patient-Physician Relationship, Drug Manufacturers
can Protect Themselves by Warning Consumers Directly, 69 DEF. COUNS. J. 79, 87 (2005)
(stating DTC advertising changed the roles and relationships of patients and physicians and
undercut the premises of the LID as DTC removes the physician from the learned intermediary
role and encourages patients to request certain pharmaceuticals).
307. Robinson, Jr. & Calcagnie, supra note 78, at 1.
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Merck’s liability should not simply rest on the fact that Vioxx was marketed
directly to the consumers, but instead on whether meeting FDA mandates
suffice to meet the manufacturer’s duty to adequately warn prescribing
physicians.
Considering increases in medical malpractice suits against doctors, and
that the duty to warn should remain with those physicians, perhaps it is time
for part of the burden of the duty to warn to fall on another group. 308
Regardless of the duty imposed by state and federal regulations regarding
product warning requirements, and likely to be an unpopular suggestion,
perhaps the consumers should have the ultimate duty of inquiring into
substances they ingest. Consumers are undoubtedly aware some risks and
potential side effects are inherent in taking prescription drugs. The best tool
for educating the public as to possible adverse effects of pharmaceuticals may
be to place a share of the burden directly on the consumer himself to inquire
into those effects. The question of “how might this drug affect me?” should be
the first statement out of a patient’s mouth after requesting any pharmaceutical
treatment.
The doctrine of caveat emptor was once the predominate rule in
purchasing products and property. Perhaps a revival of the doctrine, even to a
slight degree, would be the best policy for ensuring consumers are aware of
potential adverse effects of pharmaceuticals. To borrow a moderately
applicable quote, “[m]y point is that you have to think for yourself. If your
parents told you that chocolate was dangerous would you take their word for
it? Exactly! So perhaps instead of acting like sheep when it comes to
[pharmaceuticals] you should find out for yourself.” 309
COREY SCHAECHER*

308. Please note that it is far from this author’s opinion that health care providers should face
any increase in liability. In fact, it is unfortunate doctors are facing the current litigious climate
which surrounds their profession. Also please note that patients should not have to rummage
through obscure documents to be apprised of dangers associated with a prescription drug.
Instead, the suggestion is that the patients should take some responsibility in being aware of the
drug’s possible adverse affects and contraindications.
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